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cncuuragemem or suppim of private discrimination on the one hand from
(permissible) neutral 1oleration on the other. Judge Posner's words quoted earlier
from the hostile environment discrimination case help make the point: states
often deny the equal protection of the laws not by acting, but by omitting to
act against private discriminatory action within such areas of responsibility as a
government workplace. The point becomes more forceful as, with the growth
uf th<; modem welfare and regulatory state, government's sphere of activity
bro:~dens, and increased supervision of areas of private conduct brings with it
more responsibility for that conduct.sl
·
Further, when we look beyond formal constitutional doctrine, we find that
our actual civil-rights practices place little weight on th~ _public-private distinction.
The social condemnation of a fonn of discrimination as invidious brings it
wi_thin the anti-discrimination principle. This principle typically leads both to
judicial prohibition of the official forms of prejudice and legislative prohibition
wh ere it appears "privately" in employment, housing, education, and public
:u.:commodations. By contrast, our civil-liberties practices exhibit no parallel
tendency toward .legislative protection of Nazis, Klansmen, and flag-burners
a~ainst private discrimination. "Tolerance," a civil-rights word, and "toleration,"
a <:i,·il-liberties word, name quite different values.
And as I have already stressed, the civil-rights approach likewise docs not
sharply distinguish betwee·n speech and actjon. "Sticks and stones may break
my bones, but words will never hurt me" - which expresses in homely fonn
the f-irst Amendment's 13r:mdeisi:in ideal of self-reliant civic courage 51 - does
not apply "within a. framework of analysis in which the central injury to be
avnidcd is stigma and humiliation - injury to a socially constructed (and hence
socially destructible) personality. Words and symbols arc among the chief weapons
for inflicting this forn1 of injury. The point becomes clear when one reads the
f:~cts of some of the hostile environment discrimination cases; anyone will agree
with Judge Posner that the Yictims in these cases have suffered discrimination
in "terms and condi tions of employment" as surely as if they had been made
to do extra work for th e s:~mc pay on account of tl1eir rnce or sex.n
~~"ll>u< in Slorllry r·. ~o.·'""""· lH U.S. l (l9~R), ntensi•c lcr;•l •up<nition of the klnd• of cnrorceobk

1\tnnin~ wilh tht bnd rendered cn(orccmcnl of a nclaJ(y rcUrktiYe pri'riiC <OYCnutl dlscrlmiJIIIOfJ
\Ute >Ciion ; in 7"rrry r.
HS U.S. 461 (19SJ), cncruive stale rcJUialion or tlcclloM rendered the exclUJionuy
pnrcit•<' nl the lorm•ll~ rn\"IIC T nu J•)·bird l>cmucrotic Club (in cfTectthe white nemocrotic Pony) dlscrimlruiO<)'
\111< >Ctio,n ; in ll•rrmt ,.. Wilm iwpM Porn•~ --f~IAon"!r· ll>S U-"· 715 (1961). public owncnhip and opontlon
' p1<~in~ ~·uge ( constitution> II)· cnt>nglcJ the nate In the ucbl crclusinn pucticcd by a pn\•ately-owneJ ruuuranl
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Sec the l>nt"ngc from Ju,oticc Oran~eis's opinion in 117oit•<1 t·. C41ifomisl. quoted In text accompanylns note

>N"'e. •
,, Thu' in 8oAl"'> ••• F.sul C~it~(.O. the rhintifT, a female fire department dispatcher. h•d to d<>l with a IUp<rvio«
""" ,..,. c••nst>ntly "<p<>king to her enrircly o( scru>l manen and d~ribina his prcfcncd sc:rual poaltlo!la.
1\uhtn"c r ll nkiruliun, an.J hi' C''W'pCCI.Iiliun~ (nt hC'r bth:avinr: f"unhcr. she w·u ... conrinual fatltl for obJcnw
l•om.mcnl\ h) firelighter• lOll hthcr m>lc empluycn and .... r,.,ccd 10 listen 10 their filthy ullr. and dcscrlpdonl
.,f their \C<U>l f>nt>)i(\ nf which she ,..,. the object.• A r.rc cap11ln told her thJt "• rorcihlc Df'C' In some nearby
n........ uiJ impro« l'>tr dis('<l\ilinn.· 7~'1 f .ld. I'll· 1182-83.
In l :t:()(: t·. •ti•'!'AJ" .llnror frntAr l.inn. ~gR F. Surr . 3ft I (D. !\linn. 1980), Ray Wells, • bl1ck dodman,
"'" • ul>jcCicd rc~"\lbrly to uci•l 1lun on ch>l~loo>rds anil<hed to lo>ding coru; "Ray Wells is 1 nlner." "The
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These same hostile environment discrimination cases likewise provide some
of the best examples of civil rights analysis that blur the "speech-action" as
well as the "public-private" distinction . When a private employer is held liable
under Title VII for not taking reasonable steps to prevent racist or sexist verbal
assaults by employees on their fellow workers, ·the government is in effect
imposing (as sovereign, not employer) a content- and viewpoint-specific regime
of censorship on the speech of private employees. The American Civil Liberties
Union has seen the point; it opposes liability for employers or schools who fail
to prevent verbal sexual harassment that "has no other effect on its recipient
than to create an unpleasant working [learning) environment."S6 But I have
found that many good civil-libertarians see these hostile environment cases (at
least In the employment context) through the ·civil-rights lens; tl1ey thus agree
with current law in accepting that an employer should be obligated to police
the workplace to some extent against even purely verbal abuse when it becomes
so pervasive and differentially "unpleasant" on grounds of race or sex to affect
~mployees' terms and conditions of employment.

IV
I have tried to suggest how the civil-liberties :~nd civil-rights approaches
overlap and clash on the issue of discriminatory harassment; apparently, no
higher principle of comparable force and vitality can resolve their conflict. 57 Do
these two approaches simply represent, respectively, right- and left-wing political
tendencies within American liberalism? It is possible to tell the story that way:
civil-liberties (and its marketplace of idc:~s) tl1en represents a ~ying classical
liberalism, while civil-rights (and its society of equal groups) reprcscnt.s a post- ·
liber:1l social democracy struggling to be born. Or (to Oip the political poles of
the historical plot-line) civil liberties now represents the true liberal future at
this moment of tl1e end of history, while the asymmetric civil-rights project will
be rejected along with other misguided attempts to inject communitarinn ideals
into the legal governance of free societies.
Both of these sketches operate on tl1e "contradiction" hypotl1csis; they postulate,
on the basis of the structural conflict between the civil-rights and civil-liberties
approaches, that one should give way in the name of principled consistency.
Following tl1is analysis, one could press (from Ule right) toward a more fonnal
ooly cood nincr Is a dead nincr." "Nincn arc • Uvintr ex.ample that lmli>ns screwed buiT•lo.· When Wells
atancd eatinr In another room, hio while co-worken w.·ore "nin.:n only" above the door. Man>zemcnt did
1101hlnr In response to compl>!nLS. Sec pp.· 38-4-SS.
14 Polily Cuik oftAufCLU (rev. cd. 1989), at H2, 400.. The ACLU ('<lSirion requires distinguishing between
ljmxc<ted) vcrlt>l >busc th•t merely rcndcn the cnviron<Ocnt "unpleu•nt" and th11 which crosses the liric to
lanlctins octionable emotional distrcu - l'>ardly o brisht line. My th•nks to N•dinc Stro<scn fnr rroviding me
dot tm of these ACLU provisions.
11 Which Is not to uy that verbal (ormul>e m>y not be oiTrrcd tn •urrty furm>l or >Uthetic resolution to libcnl
tlotory and hence present It u a clcned S)"11crn. John R•wh anempts such a dosll<c with his lcalol orderin~ ol
lbcny oY<r equal opponunhy In A Tlrro? •f]•llltr: the difficulty Is to defend the subsconcc or this firm hicnr<hy.
}oocph Ru suM>llcs an anncrivc ovenrching account or ">utonomy• as thr surrcmc libcnl ••luc, resolving
~ -cquoliry connicb, In Tlrr Mor~liry •f fmJt.m . I m)'\tlf prefer the fnnk pluulism or h•i•h Ucrlin in "Twn
<Anccpu of Libcny," Fo•r £u•1• .., Librny. pp. 167-72 (London: <hfard, 1969).
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and neutral "L•vil-liberqcs" style of anti-discrimination law or {from the left)
toward a more substantive and result-oriented "civil-rights" version of free
speech law.
The former move would incline toward an ideal of formal neutrality in civil
rights law, one that stressed not the abolition of caste or status-subordination
but the elimination from law of "suspect classifications" - distinctions based
upon individuals' immutable characteristics. The latter move would give a larger
role in First Amendment law to correction of market imperfections in the
marketplace of ideas, pursuing policies such as realistically equal access to
media, opening debate to the participation of those previously silenced by social
subordination, and so on. As this essay perhaps suggests, I am more inclined
to go in the latter directjon than in the former, but I am not inclined to go
very far~ 8 - nothing like far enough to bring civil-liberties law into full consistency
with the public-private and speech-action treatments characteristic of current
civil-rights law.
What, then, is the alternative .to seeing this incommensurable conflict as
contradiction? My answer is already implicit in the body of the essay; it can be
roughly captured by the slogan that the civil-rights approach embodies a proj((f,
which is to be carried on within a framework constituted by the civil-liberties
approach. Civil rights has statable social goals, however utopian: the abolition
of racism, sexism, and other forms of bigotry. It postulates disease-like social
conditions and collective enemies; it then sets us the task of struggling against
these and, ideally, eliminating them. The civil-rights mentality represents our
collective self-commitment to a definite, though limited and negative, judgment
about the nature of the good society, or at least the good society for us - it is
one without castes (whether of race, or sex, or sexual orientation, or ...). Civil
rights Ia~ is then conceived mainly as an instrumrol toward that end.
Note that this instrumental account of civil-rights doctrine characterizes even
those who arc unhappy with affirmative action and who tend to support a
symmetric version of anti-discrimination law. First, in my experience, few
adherents of this view support a wholehearted symmetry in practice. Second,
the reason for this shows up in their arguments; they oppose affirmative action
as counter-productive, as a poor strategy in the effort to attain what all concede
to be the long-run goal: a caste-free society. To usc race as a principle for
distributing burdens and benefits, they argue, is to legitimize it as a ground for
social action; this reinforces the tendency to revert to less benign uses in
moments of social panic or pressure. These neutralists on civil rights are thus,
at bottom, instrumentalists too; they share the same conception of tl1c overriding
goal, only disagreeing on the best means by which to pursue it. 59
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The civil-liberties approach, whether in its . right- or left-wing versions,
postulates no goal for society in the same sense. What would society look like
if the "aims" of the First Amendment were achieved? It would be a society
where people coult.l in general say what they have tn say, hut this merely restates
First Arnent.lmcnt dtlctrinc in summary form without articulating a social goal
at which it aims. Attempts to state positive goals for the First Amendment
typically produce vague and edcctic wish-lists that arc of little help in shaping
free speech doctrine. A similar point could be made, I believe, of the free
exercise clause and some aspects of the right of privacy. We cannot say anything
very definite about how society would look if these civil-libertarian rights were
fully realized.
We might fairly say that these provisions aim at an open society, but that is
to say only that they aim :ll a society that might look like anything at all. Their
very goallessness is in a sense the point· of these provisions. They capture our
skeptical sense that we do not, in general, know where we arc going; we have
no dominant overall collective project, and we want to keep it that way. The
first Amendment, along with the other "civil liberties,"GO is there to maint:tin
possibilities, to keep the future open to the presently unpredictable workings
of the human imagination. Its eiTective enforcement requires a strong dose of
skepticism - not (a self-contradictory) "absolute relativism," but a skeptical
ollitudc toward collectively-imposed substantive moral judgments. (This skepticism
is not inconsistent with a fair degree ofromanticism about the possible achievements
of the unchecked human imagination.)''' By contrast, the civil-rights approach,
on its more limited subject (the intolerability of a sntcm of group subordination
or caste), is not skeptical at all - no more skeptical than were the abolitionists.
(Of course, a degree of skepticism about the possibility of authoritatively ranking
human beings, hence nf identifying "natural aristocrats," also lends . s~ppon to
this limited egalitarian ;tbsolutism.)
.
In this ctmtr;~st between the dominant skeptic-ism of. the· civil libertarian and
the tlomin:tnt confidence of the ciVil-rights advocate lies the best anl;wcr to the
objection that a narrow prohibition of discrimin:ttory harassment violates "view
point-neutrality" by discriminating in favor of the Left :tgainst the Right on
issues relevant to civil-rights concerns. The answer is that if the prohibition
has been framed narrowly enough, it docs preserve practical neutrality - that
is, it does not difTercntially deprive any significant clement in American political
life of its rhetorical c:~pit :ll. I would argue that' this is the case with the Stanford
provision. The Right has no special stake in the free face-to-face usc of epithets

c..,•.

10? S. Ct. 706. 72 I (t'JWI). involh.btin~ a munidpal minoriry bu•inus sct·>Siuc ptllgtlm. the Co~n
Njnri~)' :SIJtctl the ~trnunJs. fur rrc:~tlng cw:n hcnign uci}t cla~sificarion~ u suspcL·t in tcmu instrumcnral ro 3n
anri·C>\tc goal : "Ciusificatiun_; l»><tl nn <>r< c>rry • danaer nf .cigm•tic hinn .... 1lrey m•r in f2c1 promute

~~"I hu< I S)mp>thiT.C ,.;th (),.en Fi,,,·s surgcsrinns for moving First Amcndmcnl docuinc in. more rcalisrically
·· dcm•"-ntic dirccrinn in his "Free Sp<·c<h amJ S<:><:i>l ScruciUr<,- lorN/..... Rn·itTP. vol. 71 (1986). p. t.fOS. Oa
the other hand, I stnp shun uf cnJur.lin~ chil-righu-hucd bans on p<>ccnlia.lly broad content-de lined cstc,.,Ot11
.,r 'i'«<h: raci\1 >f'<"ech, as endorsed by llhri 1\huud•. -l'ubllc Ruponse"; or scxlu pomognrhy, u in lhc
trani,·Lin~ pro,·isions uf the Indianapolis >nti-pomographr ordlrnncc irwalid>tcd In lfmrrir4n DO!I!:ullm Au•• 1\
/luJ""'· 77t F.2d JZJ (7th Cir. t985).
"Thus in the moSI "ncutulisl- of' recent Supreme Court ci1il-righu decisions. Ci(Y of Rirhmond 11. J- .•.

IIOiion t of nci•f inferinri•y and lc•d "' J politih nl' udal 1luostiliry."
'"The l'in t Amrn~ntcnt I< '"" tied (as the free c•crcis., 2nd prii'Ol')' rights ue nut) ru the prcscrvlliCin of a
fun('tionins t.fcrnucr21k S)liCm o( ~O\'C't-n•ncm; howcrcr. there coult.l conctinhly b( ll working fret spc:cch gu2untcc,
Jo.ntificd •ton3 the lines I tug~cst. C\cn in • lihcral bu1 umlcmocmic sutc.
"Thi, rom>nric •ide of the chil-lihrrtiu n1cnulicy i• vc,ry annctively presented in Stcl'en ShiiTrin, Tlrr Finr
.(owJ,,I, DnnMTnry. Dnd Rnmnnu (C•n•LriJFc : I h r< >rJ lJni>crsicy Press, 19'10).
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that perform no other function except to portray whole classes of Americans
as suhhuman am) unworthy of ftill citizenship.

v
In conclusion, I must return to answer an objection .to the Stanford provision
that I have heard from critics ofboth the civil-rights and civil-liberties persuasions.
This has to do with the ch:uge that the regulation is drafted so narrowly as to
make it "merely symholic," a point that evidently engages one of the key
differences between the two approaches. I readily agree that the provision
prohibits very little of the behavior that creates the significantly discriminatory
hostile environment that faces students of color and others on many campuses.
So why bother with it? The point is made with special force by civil libertarians,
who think the proposal exacts a high cost in principle through its incursions
into the indivisible fabric of the first amendment. But egalitarians, on their side,
can also object on principle to the provision as a form of tokenism.
I also concede that the main good the provision can do is through its educative
or symbolic effect - though I would add that the harms its opponents see in
it arc likewise largely symbolic as well. The question then arises: why can we
not get the same educative effect through official statements, declarations of
concern, and the like, issued witH'appropriate vehemence by university authorities
whenever serious incidents of racist verbal abuse occUJr? Let me suggest a partial
answer by modifying a hypothetical situation I posed earlier.
Suppose a state legislature declared a "white supremacy day," perhaps invoking
the descriptive and predictive terms of Justice Harl:m's dissent in Plmy v.
Fcrtwon as :~n ideal. ("The white uce deems itself to be the dominant race in
this country. And so it is.... So, 1 doubt not, it will continue for all time, if
it remains true to its great heritage . . . .")" 1 That would be a terrible thing,
hut would it be unconstitutional? 1 think it would be - but 1 also admit there
is at least some doubt as to the answer. On the other hand, there is no <loubt
at all that state imposition of racial segregation in public facilities, even if they
maintain perfect material <:quality, are unconstitutional. Yet by hypothesis the
injury, the stigma of official racial insult, is the same in both cases - or, if
anything, more explicit and obvious in the case of "white supremacy day." Why
is segregation more obviously unconstitutional?
One an!iwcr: hecause the government delivers tl1e insult with more force (and
hence compounds the injury) when the action expressing the insult dots something,
even if the thing done is (apart from the insult) not itself discriminatory. We
think of g!Wcmmcnt as primarily an instrument for the maintenance of law and
order and the provision of material public goods. 63 Its ideological centrality in
our lives derives mainly from its role as the primary repository of legitimated
power in society. It provides such a "bully pulpit" largely bccauu it already ha5
''lh.l l ".S. S.17. HV (IH9h). :\Ciu>l current CMirO\"crsicJ th>l nisc this issue (tlun•Jh less narkly) includt the
runrinunJ unici.1l U\C h' ~uuthrm lUlU u( lhC' Cnnfc4.1tr.alc 0JJ.
''Thi< im·t m•c nf ~m·cmmcnt in >II ,,,..ictics: stt CliiTurd Gccrn, Nf1.•r•: 711, 711tolrr Sl•lt iM Ni•t1tt>t1A
,,-,,.,., R•lo {Princrtnn: Prinrcton Cni,crsity Prcs.s. 1980).
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so finn a grip on our attention ihmugh its coercive powers of taxation and bw
enforcement.
For this reason, government speaks most clearly when its message is delivered
lhrough tl1e exercise of one of those powers, such as the provision of schools,
parks, and tl1e like. We think of joint resolutions de!;ignating state flowers and
mayoral proclamations of schoolteacher week as quite apart from the serious
business of government. The adoption of a racist resolution or motto, then,
!hough unconstirurional, would not be as obviously so as would, say, resegregating
!he seats in the courthouse. When the government acts - when it does something
- it puts its money where its mouth is.
Similarly, when a university administration backs its anti-racist pronouncements
wilh action, it puts its money where its mouth is. The action, if it is to serve
this purpose, must be independently justifiable - independently, that is, of the
symbolic purpose. Authorities make tl1e most effective statement when they are
honestly concerned to do some thing beyond making a statement. And the action
of punishing persons who violate the Stanford harassment regulation is justifiable
independent of the statement it makes. It provides a r.emedy for an action that
causes real pain and harm to real. individuals while .<:loing no good, and it may
serve to deter such actions in the future.
Notice that the idea of Lhe "main business of govemment" advanced here is
derived from the classical liberal conception of the state, which in tum lies at
!he heart of the civil-liberties approach: In that conception, government exists
to prevent private force and fraud and to supply tangible public goods by taxing
1nd spending. And tJ1at is basically all it is there for; its other functions arc
either suspect or "merely symbolic." Yet throughout this essay I have contrasted
that conception of government to one implicit in the civil-rights approach, which
undermines t-raditional public-private distinctions as well :1s denying the automatic
association of "merely" with "symbolic" or "intangible" when discussing of the
kind of effects law and government should be centrally concerned with.
And yet, at the end, I revert to slogans involving a distinction between real
sl2te action and mere gesture! The point is that neither the civil~li.berties nor
the civil-rights approach will go away; sometimes, a.s here, one of'them even
feeds on the otl1er. With that suggestion of the sometimes paradoxical interweaving
of these perspectives, incommensurably co-existing ·at the heart of modem
liberalism, let me call a halt to this very !in)itcd examination of their mutual
relations.

Low, Stanford University

..,,
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CIVIL RIGHTS VS. CIVIL LIBERTIES

,_.,·PENDIXj TilE STANfORD DISCRIMINATORY
HARASSMENT PROVISION

In the context of discriminatory harassment, insulting or "fighting" words or
non-verbal symbols arc those "which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace," and which arc commonly
understood to convey direct and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings
on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or
national and ethnic origin.

PREAMBLE

The Fundamental St~mdard requires that stude!rtts act with "such respect
for ... the rights of others as is demanded of good citizens." Some incidents
in recent years on campus have revealed doubt and disagreement about what
this requirement means for students in the sensit.i•1e area where the right of
free expression can conflict with the right to be free of invidious discrimination.
The Student Conduct Legislative Council offers this interpretation to provide
students and administrators with some guidance in this area.

FUNDA.\tENTAL STANDARD INTERPRETATION: FREE EXPRESSION AND
DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT

I. Stanford is committed to the principles of free inquiry and free expression.
Students have the right to hold and vigorously defend and ·promote their
opinions, thus entering them into the life of the University, there to flourish
or wither according to their merits. Respect for this right requires that students
tolerate even e>.'Pression of opinions which they find abhorrent Intimidation of
students by other students in their exercise of this right, by violence or threat
.. of violence, is therefore considered to be a violation of the Fundamental Standard.
2. Stanford is also committed to principles of equal opportunity and non
discrimination. Each siUdent has the right of equal acce:;s to a Stanford education,
without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual
orienta tion , or national and ethnic origin. Harassment of students on the basis
of any of these characteristics contributes to a hostile environment that makes
access to education for those subjected to it less than equal. Such discrimi
natory harassment is therefore considered to be a violation of the Fundamental
Standard.
3. This interpretation of the Fundamental Standard is intended to clarify the
point at which protected free expression ends and prohibited discriminatory
h:~ras:;rncnt begins. Prohi~ired · harassment includes dis.crirninatory intimidation
hy threats of violence, and also includes personal vilification of students on tl1e
ba sis of their sex, race, colo,r, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national
and ethnic origin.
4. Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification
if it:
'
a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of
individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handic~p. religion, sexual
orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or
stigmatizes; and
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words o~ non-verbal symbols.
_,
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RACIAL HARASSMENT POLICY
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, is committed to
creating and maintaining an environment in which the faculty, staff and
students work together in an atmosphere of mutual respect and free
academic interchange. In the University environment, all faculty, staff and
students are entitled to be treated on the basis of their qualifications,
competence and accomplishments without regard to race or ethnicity.
Individuals are entitled to benefit from all University activities and
programs as well as to conduct their daily affairs on campus without being
discriminated against on the basis of race or ethnicity.
·
This policy seeks to prevent racial/ethnic harassment and provide prompt
and equitable relief to the extent possible when such activity is observed
and/or reported. While the University embraces the principles of free
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, it abhors the deliberate abuse of this freedom by those who
would provoke hatred and/or violence based on race and ethnicity.
Because racial harassment* creates an atmosphere of intimidation and
hostility inconsistent with University goals, California Polytechnic State
University, San Luis Obispo neither tolerates nor condones racial
harassment towards any individual. Racial harassment is defined as:
1. oral, written, or physical acts conveying racial overtones; and/or
2. reprisals, threats of reprisal, or implied threats of reprisal following
a racial harassment complaint.
Examples of racial harassment include, but are not limited to:
oral--derogatory or slanderous comments, jokes, epithets,
or ethnic slurs, especially those making use of "fighting words;"**
written--written derogatory or libelous comments, jokes, epithets
or ethnic slurs, especially those making use of "fighting words;"**
physical--physical violence and destruction of property, the
display of racially offensive objects or pictures, cartoons or posters.
Such behavior is especially egregious if it is repeated or if it constitutes a
repetition of past similar behavior.

-3-

Racial harassment violates University policy, and seriously undermines the
academic and working environment. Program managers, Department
Heads/Chairs and student leaders are responsible for taking appropriate
steps to disseminate and support this policy statement. All faculty, staff,
administrators and students will be h,eld accountable for compliance with
this policy.

* In the context of this policy, the tenn racial harassment also includes
harassment based on ethnicity.
* * Fighting words are those that are directed at an individual and are likely to cause
the average person to retaliate and precipitate a breach of the peace.

Subject: Unci: Productivity Discussio~ 4 -

\Ck:
=:·li~Jqested that I ·fon·Jar-·d for yow- reviei•J the outline c•f
productivity enhancement options that we developed for our initial"
pr· eser,tation to the Chancellm-. Please note that this is effectively a
.nenu from which policy choices could be made and not a firm statement of
Ur,iveFsity plans. F'le.::~se give me a call if you hav·e any questions abOLit
the attached. -·- Dan
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F't··oclucti-..,.ity Enhancements and Employee Incentives

F'l'·od'..IC'i:. i vi ty Enl··,an<:ements

Potential academic productivity gains should be conceived along two
dimensions:
~'. Tile potential to pt·oduce moF e SCU' s vJi th e:-: i sting i nst i tuti anal
resources, through mare effective use of those resources.

is': l'"he potential to produce mot-e SCU' s and mor·e successful! y cornpl eted
SCU's through gains in student productivity.

1. Using institutional resources in more innovative

ways~

Cal Poly will

explore ways of achieving:
A.

Increased FTES Per Fixed Costs
1.

By moving to true year-round operations,

s: u.;runet·· t

fully subscribing the

t?t· ill.

2. By utilizing distance learnina tecbnolcgy to serve a larger number
of students Cbey~nd the physical l~mits of our present facil ities)
~r1d / ot'"· to liiC:We efficiently utjli:ze faculty teaching in 101...,·-demC:Ind
•.::OUt'"SES.

B.

Increased FTES:FTEF Ratio

1. By utilizing instt-Lictional suppc•rt resoLn-ces- assi:.tants.
instructional technology - to enable faculty to manage the ins~ructi on
of a larger number of students.

•

-5-

JI. Cc;..l r-·c.·ly !•Jill e:d=:.o e:·:plo,-e I•Jays o ·f attaining gains in ~· tL\dent
pr-oduct i vi t.y.
Pd·.. present. : .tudefit pr-oduc:ti vi ty gai r.s are nclt

I" e\<Jarded by the CSU
·stem's funding formulas. To the extent that we shift our focus to
::::.·tudent f:H-oductivity, \•ie may I•Jish to ::.eek shifts in the funding/re\~a,-d
structure away from FTES counts to student outcome measures.

i::C.rnong

1.

the poter.tial prodLtctivity enh2.ncements Cal Poly 1-1ill e:-;plw-e:

Initiatives - for example, in the area of financial aid students to attempt more SCU's on average.

that

p~ r mit/encourage

2.

More intrusive advisement, utilizing technology to establish student
p 1 a1 ·1s of stLtdy and moni tot- student pt-ogress to degt-ee.

3. Expanded use of instructional technology - and/or other instructional
s.uppot-t nH?t.hods- to increa:.e student pass ,~ates in academic cc.•Ln--ses.
4. Expanded access by students to information resources,
t:t"'·t:hrlol ogy.

through use of

Employee Relations and Incentives
Consi st.c:·nt vJi th the:! need to ef fec:t pi·- oduct i vi ty enhancements for- the
efficient accommodation of added enrollment, the University is s
ensitive to the need for strong relations with employee groups and the
creationof appropriate incentives to reward efforts of facult y and

staff .
.feat:Lwe o ·f the e>:plot-ation of the chat-ter campus conc.:ept included the
creation of an Employee Relations Committee. This committee w as the
t- e~ult of meet and confer sessions vJith t-epresentation of all
bargainingunits and has the endorsem~nt of the CSU and of the s tatewide
bargaining units (Units 6 and 8 serve in an observer capacity by
theirchoice).

* The

committee~ through the exploration of specific issues~ is
attempting to define parameters and guidelines that would lead to a
poter,tial -ft-·arne\o'Jc.t-k for th~ cl-e<:~tion CJf campus-specific sidebar
':':t.ql'.. t::E·mel ·l t s .

It. is envisioned that this type of mechanism ~·1auld ·facilitate a
linkage between productivity and incentives not currently recogniz ed or
possible.
;t.

i nc:enti ves COLil d be! i ndi vi dual or· gt-oup, monetat-y or nc.in-··monet.:(ry.
optimization of the deployment of our human resource s toward
,;o.c:h i evi ng ent-oll r11ent objectives can best be accomp 1 i shed tht- ough the
overt linkage of productivity with incentives.

~3t;tch

Clearly~

t,Je hope to develop mc•dels t.liat

c.:<:~n

be ,-eplicated else\·Jhet-e in the CSU

Syste:T1.

·-·s·r•efits to Studel,ts
I r. l he event that the cost o -f enr-·oll ment gr·o\<Jth is I·Jholl y funded tht-ough
i11creased revenues, which may come from increased appropriat ions and/or
:l nc1· eased ·fees, the question ~·Ji 11 at- i se c•f 1-1hat benefits fo1~ student:.

-6

dt• e ciS~. c.c.:i ated 1-Ji th the hi ghet- cos:.t. The best ans:.w et- ~·Ji 11 be deri \.•ed
!.: ht-·ouqh a d).alogue ~>"Jith paying stakehaldet'"S by asking them ~·Jhat they
l·.•c•uld like ·fur tho::e additional e:·:penditure·s.
r plan presents a list of potential benefits to be
dialc:•gue ~-Jith stakehold10r·s:

'"~·

created~

following

..

I.

Increased personal attention

,'::·~.

Pet-s.oroal i zed .:;,dvi sing and easi 1 y access.i bl e neb·JC•r ked ad vi si 111~

in f

cwm<:~t

i eon

B. Automated transcript evaluation
C. Guat··anteed access to clas.ses "j\.\St in time" t<.l meet theitstudy demands.

pt-ofJi~am

of

D. Full screen information while registering
1. course availability
2. schedule information

"One stop :.hop" for University imposed contacts
·Fee payment
housin1:;} and othet·· aLixili.:lt-y fees
financial aid

E:..

1.
2.
3.

C.H i11q:.H uveJ ir ... c.lc:-\SS attetd.ic.H1
same or smaller class sizes
2. increased class sizes accompanied by offsetting opportunities for
personal attention:
a. cout·- ·::.e ~·.•at-e
b. increased student assistants
c. tutorials available through information t~chnology over the network
•

i:::·l.t:.·.:\(:1-y

1.

II.
A.

Improved access to services

Library access
1. real time~ i.e.
2. virtual access

hours doors are open

D. Dthet-· ins:.tt·uc:tional ser·v ic:es
l. email
:::. dt:ita bases
3. software tools
4. multimedia courseware
C.

Administrative information
schedule
2. gra.des
3 . : .tatLtS
4. pet-scmal information
i..

0. i-Ii gher 1 evel s of student/academic suppc•rt services
1. tutorial services
2. psychological services
3. student life and activities
4. ccu~eer and placement set·- vices
5. assessment and testing services
6. special support programs (Minority Engineering~ Student Academic
Services~ Multicultural Programs and Services, Women's Programs and
Services)

; Free Speech Returns to Stanford
Law: Court ranks the First
Amendment ahead of 'hurt
feelings' in nullifying a code that
was a model for many campuses.
111

By NAT HENTOFF
In 1990, Stanford University enacted a
speech code that prohibited :·person~!
vilification of students on the bas1s of their
sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sex'Ual
orientation, or national and ethnic origin."
Its core was the largely unused "fighting
words" exception to the First -"'-mendment
in the 1942 Supreme Court's Chaplinsky
decision.
Preceding the code was a vigorous
two-year debate on campus. \Vhat particu
larly startled me then was a letter in the
Stanford Daily urgently advocating an
even harsher speech code than th~ admin
istration's. The Jetter was signed by the
African American Law Students Assn., the
Asian American Law Students Assn. and
the Jewish Law Students Assn.
· The most distinguished opponent of the
) speech code on campus was Jaw professor
Gerald Gunther, arguably the preeminent
constitutional scholar in the country. Gun
ther had received his elementary school
education in Germany, and during the
Stanford debate, he noted that as a child,
his teacher, fellow students and the towns
people. would address him as l1tdensau
Jewishpig.
But, he said, he learned long ago that the
way to deal with vicious speech is "with
more speech, with better speech, with
repudiation and contempt."
Gunther, however, lost the battle over
what he called "this hideous precedent" of
a speech code.
For years, Stanford had prized itself for
adhering to First Amendment standards of
free speech even though it is a private

university.
Involuntarily-as of February-Stan
ford is back on a First Amendment stand
ard because of a suit brought by a Jaw
school alumnus, 27- year-old Robert Corry,
and eight other alumni and students still at
Stanford. They claimed that the speech
code obstructed "the development of a
healthy atmosphere of free and open
discussion on campus."
Santa Clara County Superior Court
Judge Peter Stone declared the Stanford
code unconstitutional because it was "ov
erbroad," thereby punishing speech that
goes beyond "fighting words." After all,
Stone ruled, "Stanford cannot proscribe
speech that hurts the feelings of those who
hear it." The university, having targeted

'Tribalism and tensions have
increased despite speech
codes. . . . "If you're fearful
that somehow you will
misspeak, you wind up
avoiding the very people you
need to get to know."'
"the content of certain speech," violated
the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.
But how does the First Amendment
apply to a private university"? It does in
California because of the 1992 "Leonard
law": Private educational institutions may
not discipline any student "solely on the
basis of ... speech or other communica
tion that when engaged in outside the
campus is protected from government
restriction by the First Amendment."
Stanford's defeat is likely to affect ·
private and public colleges in other states.
Indeed, Sheldon Steinbach, general coun
sel for the American Council on Educa
tion-representing 1,700 colleges and uni

versities-told the San Francisco Chrolii
cle: "This is the final nail in the coffin :oi
speech codes."
Court rulings aside, the codes have
worked. Tribalism and tensions have in
creased despite speech codes. Actually, :in
part because of them. As Steinbach says.
. ''if you're feariul that somehow you \olill
misspeak, you wind up avoiding the very
people you need to get to know." ·
:
The president of Stanford, Gerhard Cas
per. has decided that the university: \~ill
not appeal Stone's decision. Y.et the Stan
ford code had been regarded by otJier
colleges as the best drawn of all codes.
Exultantly, Paul McMasters of the Fre:e
dom Forum First Amendment Center -at
Vanderbilt University declared: "The qig
tree in the forest of speech codes has
fallen."
Although there is no "Leonard la\v"' ·in
other states, Stone gave encouragement to
.students at private universities around the
country. He approvingly cited the plain
tiffs' argument that states' civil rights,
se;mal harassment and wqrkplace -protec 
tion measures already affect private insti
tutions and individuals because-like ' the
Leonard Jaw - they are "important to the
interes.ls of the people of the state" and so
are a "constitutional exercise of the broad
police powers of the state."
Tom Grey, the Stanford law professor
who designed the speech code, wantea to
appeal the court decision. He insists
that the code has worked because nobody
was brought up on charges in thE .41h
years or its existence. A student responds,
"That indicates one hell of a chilling
efiect."
Stanford's president now moui'ns
the imposition of First Amendment stand
ards on "the fragile private sphere." st:an
ford is hardly that fragile. Nor are· its
students.

not

Nat Hentoff is an authority on the ·First
Amendment and the rest of the BiU of Rl.ghts.
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t\11 the ethnic groups in Amcr.i can life must agree to give up the political
strug-gle to control the federal government. All of them must come to believe
that they would be better off with race-neutral law, even if they might otherwise
win some rounds of political struggle for governmental favor. I believe that the
negative-sum game of ethnic politics can only be stopped by both a broad level
of popubrly supported constitutional prohibitions against it, and certain insti
tutional constraints on the political process.
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CIVIL RIGHTS VS. CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE CASE OF
DISCRIMINATORY VERBAL HARASSMENT•
lh

TtiOMAS

c.

GREY

Famomia, Gmrxc ,Hason Unircrsity
The expression of a change of aspect is tl1e expression of a n{W
perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged .
Wittgcnstein, Philosophical /nV(stigatiom 1
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American liberals believe that both civil liberties and civil rights arc harmonious
aspects of a basic commitment to human rights. Uut recently these two clusters
of values have seemed increasingly to conflict- as, for example, with the femini st
claim that the legal to le ratio n of pornography, long a goal sought by civil
libertarians, actually viol ntes civil rights as a fonn of sex discrimina~ion.
Here I propose an int erpre ta tio n of the conflict of civil rights and civil liberties
in its latest manifestation: the controversy over how to treat discriminatory verbal
harassment on American campuses . I was involved with the controversy in a
practical way at Stanford, where I helped draft a harassment regulation that
was recently adopted by the university.
Like tl1e pomography issue, the harassment problem illustrates· the clement
of paradox in the conOict of civil-liberties and civil-rights perspectives or
mentalities. This problem docs not simply trigger familiar disagreements between
liberals of a classical or libertarian orientation as against those of a welfare state
or social democratic one - though it docs sometimes do that. In my experience,
the issue also has the power to appear to a single person in di(Terent shapes
and suggest different solutions as it oscillates between being framed in . civil~ .
liberties and in civil-rights . ~enns. At the same time, however, it remains
recognizably the same problem. It is th11s a very practical and political example
of the kind of tension noted by Wiugcnstein in the aphorism that heads this
essay - a puzzle of interpretive framing, of "seeing-as."
One of my aims in this essay is to bring the reader to share the s·ense of
paradox tl1at, for me, pervades the expcri e nc~ of trying to categorize and resolve
the harassment issue . At the outset, let me sketch what I take to be the two
main structural features of the clash between the civil-liberties and the civil
rights perspectives that this problem exemplifies.
'My lhanu for ucd!enl rcseuch usisr>ncc go lo William IJoyle, Jay Fowler, •nd John Tweedy. And I •m
aho rnrcfut for !he cdi1orial suggcuions of 1Jarbu11 B>bcod, B>rbn• Fried, Muir. Kclm>n. Richud Posner,
Rob<n R>bin. Cuol Rose, jHr<s Weinucln, Sleven ShiiTrin, 2nd Sreven Winrer: of rhose who >ncndcd my
flruhy woruhop >I llo>h I loll, Univershy of Califomi>, Derkclcy; and of Ellen P>ul ond rhc or her cdiror< of
S.CW PAit.rbphy (5 Poliry. Fln>lly, special rluou, for lnsplntion, 10 Charles Lawrence Ill.
1 Ludwig Wingcnslcin, PhiloropAir.al brvmix.ari""r 19~ (Nrw York: Macmilbn, 195R).
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First, the I\' .tpproach~s take contrasting views of intangible or psychic injury.
The civil-lihcrtic:s mentality, centrally concerned with protecting freedom of
e~-prcss ion :~gaimt censorsh ip, tends 10 limit 1hc kinds of harms that can justify
:~bridgment of th:n freedom to traditionally recogni1.ed infringements of tangible
interests in property anu bodily security. In particular, claims that government
on interfere wilh speech lo protecl sensibilities, emotional tranquillity, or self
esteem - in general, Jaliugs - are strongly disfavored. h is a "bedrock principle"
of ci\·il liberties that censorship is not justified to prevent even what is "deeply
oiTensivc to many."l The civil-libertarian counsel to fellow citizens is the
tr:tdition:tl parental advice to the child wounded by insult or rejection: "Sticks
:tnt! !\tOnes m:1y break my bones, but words will never hurt me" - not hurt
c71'111K.h. that is, to justify the known costs of censorship.
lly cnntrasl, the civil-righls :tpproach, with its roors in anti-discrimination law
:~ nd );ocial policy, is centrally cnncemed with injuries of stigma and humiliation
to thw;c who arc the ,·ictims of discrimin:llion - conduct generating "feelings
of inferiority" that d:~m3ge "hearts and minds," in the langttage of the most
f:~mou s American civil rights case.l The point is not so much to protect a sphere
of :nHonomy or personal security from intmsion as to protect potentially marginal
mcmhcrs of the comm11nity from admio11 - from relegation, that is, to the
~ t :t tu s of second-class citi7.cns.
The second contrast is a relate4. one: it comes in the treatment of the public
pri\":tte tli!\tinction. The active state is traditionally · conceived as rhe sole or
tlnmin:ult threat w ci,•il liberties ." Civil libertarians do not spend much of tl1cir
timl' or ~ncrgy seeking ways to positively empower dissenters, deviants, and
IIOIH:nnl"ormists against the pressures broughr on them by unorganized public
opinion. r1r by private employers or landlords. The catalogue of civil liberties
is rc nainl~· what Judgc Richard Posner has called the Constitution: "a charter
of nq~:lli\"C r:11her than positive liberties."i
"But lw continue with the same quotation from Judge Posner) where. the
liberty :~ss c rted is the rit;ht to equal treatment irresr.~ctive of race or sex, the
:tnalysis i$ more complex."S Under the civil-rights perspective, defense of basic
human rights is by no mc:tns simply a matter of limiting slate power. Government
may tleny equal protection by omission as well as by action - for example, by
n·fu sint: 1:1\ \ " enforcement protection to minorities. The tendency of the civil
rif.(hts mcn taliry is to f:l\·nr the prohibition of all invidious treatment that has
cht· c.:ff"cct nf ~ implying inferiority in civil society" to individuals on the basis of
tl ~~: ir membership in it.l entifinblc social groups. 6 This "anti-discrimination prin
r ipk~ goes hey<lnd cle:!llsing government action of bias; it nlso attacks
d i~niminati () n on the suspect bases of race, sex, and so on, in the other major
institutions of ci\il society. Thus the identification of a new form of invidious
'l '•H.-d .\'tJtn t. f:,,.~m"" · I 10 S. Ct. l~IH, HIO (1990).
' HmJNt t HtoJrJ "/ l."JuMi•n. ]~] U.S. ~RJ, -194 (1954).
•llohrn ,.. Orr nf fall Oira.(ll. 79'1 F.2J 1180, 1189-'JO {7th Cir., 19RM (concurring opininn).

~

discrimination today typically brings with it pressure for legislation against private
as well as official discrimination of that kind in housing, employment, and
education.7
When the conflict of civil-lihcnies and civil-rights perspectives is described
in terms of the structural features just sketched, it resonates with a number of
lhe binary oppositions of social philosophy; liberty against equality; liberty ~gainst
democracy; individualism against collectivism; the methods of economics and
r.ttional choice theory against those of sociology and culrur:1l anthropology.
Though I hope what I have to say here may intrigue those interested in the
practical implications of the standard theoretical dichotomies, I do not analyze
the harassment issue in these terms.
.
This is partly to avoid one of the teJ:Tiplations of classic social philosophy,
lhe urge to make it as nearly as possible like geometry or physics. One seeks,
using this paradigm, to formulate contending theoretical positions as models,
su1ed as broadly and at the same time as rigorously as possible. Adopting this
approach, one then sees an actual controversy that brings these oppositions into
play as simply a manifestation of underlying theoretical contradictions. The
practical issue serves the purpose of forcing choice !between the theories, just
u crucia.l experiments are supposed to force choice between rival scientific
hypotheses. On the harassment issue, the structural conClict benveen civil
liberties and civil-rights approaches then naturally appears as the vivid illustration
of a contradiction between, for example, opposed libertarian and egalitarian
theories of liberalism. Intellectual rigor and respect f(lr consistency would then
require forthright resolution of the contradiction, most readily achieved by
rejecting one of the conOicring · alternatives.
This seems 10 me rhe wrong w:~y to deal with the harassment problem;
indeed, it generally seems the . wrong w:~y to deal wirh most theoretical
disagreements as they bear on social, political, and legal questions. Rarely can
important theories in these areas be plausibly formulated as models or axiom
systems precise enough to give rise to "con tradictions:." Much more often the
2ctual working theories arc perspectives, approaches, or mentalities constituted
of more or less vague (but never completely open-ended) clusrers of goals,
ideals, guidelines, :~nd presumptions. When theories this imprecise clash, !10
principle of logic requires rejection of either one. . .
Methods of social phil osophy -that seek to forml(latc: lheorics with maximum
precision do so with an eye to determinacy - they seek theories that can actually
rompd results where they apply . Theories that conflict over a practical issue
then compel conflicting results; when a contradicrion arises, one theory must
be chosen to the exclusion of the other. Yet in problcrnaric practical situations,
each of the conflicting theories (perspectives, approaches, mentalities) may have
something valuable and ev<:n essential to contribute to a resolution. In such
situations, oversharpened theories tend to produce incomplete and one-sided
'S« Paul Brut, "Fnrcword: In Dcfcmc nf the Antidiscrimin>lion l'rinciplc," 1/an•orJ La"' Rroirw. vol. 90
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outcomes, whereas a pragmatistiOierance of theoretical ambiguity and imprecision
can conduce to better results.
Such a situation is, it seems 10 me, presented by the issue of discriminatory
harassment. This problem exemplifies someth ing liberal pragmatists should accept
as normal :_ a conflict between plural, sometimes incommensurable, structured
clu~tcrs of values :uHJ principles, here the familiar ones surrounding the tcnns
~ci\· il liberties" and "civil rights." Where these conflicting approaches overlap,
as the)' inevitably will, lihcral democrats can identify a range of mediating
!:olutions \nat rc!>pect the claims of hoth conllicting approaches. I niTer the
StanforJ provision on Jiscrimioalill')' \'crh:'ll harassment as an example of such
a solution. But first I should more fully describe the practical issue and the
opposctl civil-rights and civil-liberties approaches to it.

:1

)

may be guilty of unlawful (and if a public employer, unconstitutional) race or

sex discrimination.'' Again I quote Judge Posner, certainly no civil-rights
extremist:

By taking no steps to prcvcnl: sexual harassment, the: ciry crcatetl :1
worse working environment for women than for men . . . That is
discrimination ... It is as if the city Jecided to provitlc rcstrooms for
male but not female employees, and when pressed for a 'reason said it
simply didn't care whether its female employees were comfortable or
not.12
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Thcre has recently been an upsurge in the number and intensity of reported
incidcnts of racist, homophobic, and sexist abuse in Americ:m universitics. 8 An
extreme example ,~·:a.s the incident reported at the University of Wisconsin in
wh ich white students f'ollowcd a black woman student across campus shouting
w\\'c ',·c nc\·cr tried a nigger."~ Perhaps less ~~equivocal in its implications was
tH is exchange at Stanford: after :1 dormiitory argument in which a black student
had cl:timcd that Lud\\'ig 1•an Dcethoven was a mulatto and other students had
objected 10 placing such stress on racb.l origins, two white studen.ts defaced a
pic.:turc of the composer into a blackface caricature and posted it nc:ar the black
student's room . 1' 1
The question is : what disciplinary action (if any) is appropriate in such cases?
,\ pure ~i,·il-rights approach treats the conduct in C]UCstion as discriminatory
h;Hassment. Then principles of equ:al treatment not only entitle hut rcquir(
uni1· ersitie~ to punish the bcharior, at le:ast if it becomes suOicicntly widespread
to crcate a pcr\'Jsi\'cly hostile environment. The :1nalogy is to employers'
obligations to tical with racial or sexual harassment hy fellow employees in the
workplace. \Vhcn black or female employees must endure :1 barr:tgc of r:ace
or scx-hasetl insults from co-workers, an employer who ignores the situation

"
,I

• I "' ill .. t.,•n nulc 1l•c uH•r.. in•r1it)·intt :~~~o.~umr,iun 1h .11 :all the~~ fomu. of di~crimin:ation c~n :.nd should ~
ahc 'Jn1c, t:.Sch (urm n( in~uh h:as i1s. t'I'IA1\ vniquc features and prohlcmJ, hown-tr, and may ultimacdy
~C'f'lnlh' it< n""n tli~tiOCl 1\t"kly u( legal dtM!'Irinc, u due ~ (ach fom1 o( tliKrimination rtcognlt.etl ~s "'inv\diout•
UrHirr t'tjU..II rrc)IC(lilln '""' iJn..S ci'il ri~hu. $1.11'\llt~ . I v..m, mnrcfWC'r, ru• diurimin.ation ag:~insr pys :uld lt5hlarU

U CJh'tf

• 'i•h the rcsc, lh<IUlth h tns IIIII )'tt Lu·n rrcugnb:ttl a!t in,•idin\1\ urnlcr rcdcu1 constinuiunal l:.w. A num~r
-.utc- 1n"l l• ,.:1l d'il •i,:lti'C b"''· 1nJ tht 1nd-di.\Crimin::aciun pulic-iu of many puhlic and priv21e instirutioru:
tind\ulin tt ~unft~rd) J,. rn•hihh SC'\'U.II·rrcfttcnc:c db.crimhu11inn, l j; In my \'itw :~II should.

in

o(

• 7;.,,,

B. I'JHQ, p. H'J.
h (ulry cu-duir uf lh( \'lmpu~ iUt1{cbl council :Jt Sranrurd u.hcn thi5 incident occurred~ nu disciplin&ry
~ h..trJ:''' ... rrc 11hinutd~ hruutttu . Thcrc:~ticr I wcukul f'n tht draftin1 uf a disdplinuy stanc.hrc..l ttl deal whh r&·
d•l " "'"mcnt, "hieh "H "'"r'<d ky the ompu~ lcci<bti,·e hody •ml hccame dTectivc in june of 19q0. The llee
lh"'< n in,•iol<nl ;, trutul cl•"tu,·nll!', >lrietly frnm • ci,il·ri~hts pcrspccth·c, in Patricia \\'illi•m•, "The Ohliginc Shell:
An lntumul ~:'"!' nn Fnnml F.•J•ul Opp<•nuniry," .ll id•it•• /,a,.. Rrdrrzo, mi. 87 (1989), pp. 2128, 2133-37.
tnt"'-) \

.\b)

In the case in questio n, the sexual harassment included some physical contact
and coercive sexual proposals by supervisors, as well as sexist obscenities and
epithets from fell ow workers. In discriminatory h:ar:~ssment cases, however, courts
luve not sharply differentiated between action and verbal abuse in evaluati ng
claims by black or female employees. Typically, action and speech arc blended
together in a course of conduct that gives fisc to liability for the employe r when
it creates an intolerably "hostile environment" for women or racial minori ty
employees. In some cases, which the courts h:tve nnt singled out for spcci:ll
treatment on this ground, harassment is found from speech alone - typic:~ll y :1
&\ream of racist or sexist jokes, pictures, and epithets. To :~void liabilil)·, the
employer must take re:~sonablc steps to keep verbal as well as physic:al or
otJte.rwise coercive abuse below the level of :1 "sustained pattern of hJrassment. "IJ
The decisive question is not whether the h:arassmcnt constitutes speech or
action, but whether it is widcsprc:ad and serious enough to go beyond wh:~t the
courts judge must be tolerated :IS pan of life's onJinary rough and tumbl_e.
A civil rights approach to the. verbal abuse problem on campus simply ~pplies
the doctrine of hostile c'nvironment discrimination to the university. Most
"The applic>ble leg>l pro•i•lons ore (fur most private emrlny<r<) Titl< VII of the Civil Right> Act of 1%~.
-Nch ptohibla tmp1oycf.1 frr~m dilcrin\inuintt ;ag:ainu c_tnp1o}-'ccs on the buis of race or SC'X in the •tcnns or
conditions of employment." and (for puhlk cmployu~) rhc Founetnth Amendment's rcquircmenl 1h11 no <l>t<
NJ "d.ny co any J><rson the cqu>l protection of the hws." which h>s been constmcd to pruhihir r>C< >nJ sex
diu-riminsiion In public employment,
11
6.Am u. £411 C~ico,o, p. 1191. Judg< Po<ntr ahem>tivcly •n•lyz<J 1hc emrloycr's in•<~i"n , •n•logous to
t O<lcttivc withJ~1ul of rrotcction, U ((a government odtnicd police protection IO hl1ch, or f1ileJ IO puni'h
f'IPC:I a.lone: amons viofc:m crimes.
11
ln "'' dis<'rimin>t:ion cues under Title VII, the coum dittinlf\Jhh between ·~uiJ pro quo· h>nssmcnt (cffnn<
'> ennct sci\UI (avon in rerum for jab rcrention or promotion) •nd "hn.uile en.;rnnment" h>r:usmcnt o( the
kind dC'SCribcd in the 1«1. R>ci>l b>nJsmcnl 1>\tt only the bner form , The Supreme C:nun rccogniud ho tlilc
arrlrcnmcnl scnul h>rlumenl •s a Title VII viobrion in Mmlor St11•inp Bon! 1•, l'in1on, -477 U.S. 57 (198 ~).
On hostile en.;rohment d l...:rin~ination, sec R•t"' •·· F.f.OC, 454 f'.2d 231, 2JR (Sth Cir. 1?71) ("sust><ned p>llcm
oCiwusmenl"); BunJ:y v. }G<Ioon, 6H F.ld 9H (D. C. Gr. 1?81), >nd lfr-~ron u. CifJ ofV.,nJu, 682 F.2d R?7
(l hh Clr. 1982) (su:u•l h>rusment cues invohin5 mind quiJ pro '"" •nd pure >crb>l huusment inciJcnt•);
Em.'. o. CA'1fkr Pl4ltio, 722 F.2d 1250 (6th Gr. 198Sl; EEOC,., MuryA,r Motor frtixJ.t Unt1, 4R8 V. Supr
lSI (0. Minn. t 980) (eOlployu f•ilurc to ukc sction >Jf' insl nci<t lnsuht of b!2 c~ emp!nycc hy rdtnw wo rhn
l>cld unlawful di...:rimin>lion).
·
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CIVIL RIGIITS VS. CIVIL l.lllERTIES

I

eclucawrs, like most employers, arc required by law (as they should feel required
hy fairness) to provide equal opportunity to women and students of color.
C:tmpus harassment can make rne educational environment hostile, just as
workrlacc harassment makes the employment environment so. Many campuses
have already recogni1.ed this with respect to sexual harassment and have adopted
disciplinary restrictions accordingly. There is no good reason why racial or anti
homosexual harassment should not be treated in the same way. As a legal
maner, an unremedied "sustained pattern of harassment" might make rnc
university itself guilt)' of unlawful discrimination. 14 Pmdent and sensitive admin
istrators will prohibit acts of harassment before the point at which the conduct
cumulates into a sustained pattern and thus creates a legally actionable hostile
environment.
An analysis like this can easi ly lead to a prohibition defined purely in terms
of civil rights. Thus the University of Michigan, faced with an upsurge in racial
hJrassmcnt, enacted a prohibition against any "behavior, verbal or physical" thAt
"stigmatizes or victimizes" an individual on the basis of race, sex, or other
characteristics protected under the university's non-discrimination policy and
that has the "reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual's
academic efforts," or "lclrcates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment
ror educational pursuits." This is a prohibition drafted to track the form of
injury dealt with by the civil-rights. approach - conduct contributing to a hostile
environment that denies equal educational opportunity. 1S
And yet, in" the first major case involving the regulation of campus verbal
harassment, a federal district court struck this provision down on First Amendment
grounds. 11• Civil libertarians applauded the opinion; they qualified their applause
at the rc"Sult only because the case seemed so easy that it did not establish a
particularly powerful precedent for other cases of regulation of campus harassment.
1\nd an c:~sy case it was - as soon as it was considered from the angle of a
civil-liberties, rather than a civil-rights, approach.
Viewed through a First Amendment lens, the Michigan regulation - now
seen :ts a "hate speech" or "group defamation" rule rather than a harassment
prohibition - was :t dramatically overbroad incursion into core areas of protected
speech. Comider just one example of the kind of speech prohibited by the
regulation, taken from the guidelines the university distributed to student to
cxpl:ii n the new policy:

87

A male student makes remarks in class like 'Women just aren't as good
in this field as men,' thus creating a hostile learning atmosphere for
female classmatesY
From this one can rcatlily extrapolate to other statements (made in class or in
a donn hallway debate) that would .violate the standard: arguing on the basis
or IQ data that blacks arc less intelligent tltan whites; mat homosexuality is
"unnatural," or is a disease; that women arc naturally l<:ss creative £han men. 18
The expression of tJtese opinions is certainly experienced as "stigmatizing" and
wdemeaning" by many, probably most, students belonging to the groups thus
insuhcd; when cumulated to create a climate of opinion, comments like these
might well foresccably "interfere with the academic efforts" of the students
whose basic humanity or equal mental capacity tl1ey deny.
Because the Michigan regulation has been so univet·sally condemned, it is
important to understand how campus authorities might ha'le draficd and enforced
it the way they did . They evidently viewed the problem of verbal harassment
from one perspective only: the perspective of civil rights. Viewed solely through
the lens provided hy anti -discrimination law anti policy, the kind or statements
to which d1e regulation was applied"might well appear as more polite but no
less demeaning versions of
kind of racist, sexist, or homophobic insults
routinely prohibited unc.Jcr anti-harassment
codes in t11e employment area.
I .
Indeed, the very "politeness" of these st!ltcments might rationally be thought
to make tltcm mor( disabling to the educational performance of those exposed
to them than are the relatively rare incidents involving gutter epithets. At most
universities, the victims of the crudest insults can partly discount them because
they clearly transgress the dominant mores. By contrast, the more academically
rtspcctablc forms of denigration of blacks, women, and gays can be supportetl
by evidence anc.J argttment, the forms of discourse with maximu m credibility in
the university. And the damage such statements do is probably enhanced when
the stereotypes they reinforce deny Lhe ability of groups of students to study
and learn whose members already feel marginal on many campuses. The discourse
of "statistics show ..." ;md "environmental factors cannot fully c~p.Jain .. ."
may much more effectively create a hostile education:tl environment than "[Epithet]
go home!"
·

ilie

·:;
~·

l.lut as soon as a civil-liberties· perspective is brought to bear, the kind of
speech reached by the Michigan regulation is"readily seen as close to the core
of the First Amendment. The record in the federal court challenge to the
regulation, witl1 a large number of complaints processed, and many resolved

\'A> ,.;,It public cmploycn, ohc Fuunccntll "Amendment p1ohibiu public uni¥cnitics from di<erimlnatinJ OCI
Ill< ,,,;, n( n ee or sex in pt<niding cducsrion>t ~niccs . Privstc uni>cnitiu rcccivins fcdcnl gr:anu arc sublca
10 •imihr rrc>hibirioou untlcr Tille IX o( 1hc Civil Ri~hls Act o( 19M. In some st~tcs, •IJIUI<> dso proklbll
oliscrimio >tory pr>eticcs 1>y printc unh·crsitie>. finslly. moSI priulc univenitics in !he United St.stcs have commhtrd
1hemsck<1 10 nnn·discriminstion policics. o;.hicli m>y give ris.c to contr:octusl Usbili!y when • student un .how
d is< riminui~n thst Ylnuld be unlsw(ut for • public university.
"lntlccd i1 "" n idcnrl)' dr.o(tcd on !he model o( the Equ2l Emptll)•lntnt Opportunity Commiuion JUioleUna,
.. hich oldint S<~usl hsrusmenl 10 include -._rbsl or physics! conduct o( s suus! n•rurc" lhst "hu the purr-e
nr <ITccl o( unre a,.,.nsbly intCI'(cring v.ioh >n indnidu>l"s work pcrfonn•ncc or crcstin« sn lnlimidstin&, hOttik.
' " uffcMh·c ,.·nrking cn,·irnnmcnt." 29 CFR ! 1604. 11 (>).
''Dw r·. l"nirmiry nf.\lirhit••. 711 F. Supp. 852 (E. D . l>lich. l989). Sec 856 (or !he text o( the regulation&.

VOt v. .llitAito•. p. 8S8. The tiuiJr 14"COI on Ill \I'Jm stuucnl~ IIIli
src ' '"""Cr "hen ... You
tommen l in s drro~21ory ,...). >luou1 • • • . pnup"s • • . cuhunl nrii(ins, nr rdi~inus hdicfs- - s very '"'<<pin~
Infliction on 1hc Jiscltl~inn of hhlnry· >nd current c.-cnu. I> liy.h1 nnt ~tr«nin~ 7J..r l.a,r Trmprarinn nf Chn'u or
•dlin1 1lr S111unir J'mn c:oun1 :~s "\J('wg;atul')' commcn!'.. nn ::. •!(rttup's rdi~uu~ bdic:(~·?
11
Under 1t1t Unhcn.ily n( f\1ichi,fPU fCJ(Ub.tion, 21 soci:al " 'ork l.lUd(nl w.a..c. in f:1 c1 prn!'iccutcU for cxprco.;'iinp;
~c: view tl1.31 hom0$C:Xu21ity .... as 1 c:Jh.c.hc, fe.r 'l'hkh he hnrcJ tu c.lc,·tlnp s cuuu(clinft pl~n in 2 rc~c.uch cb.'is;
""' r. AlirAi,(••. I'· R65.
other ll.\0> Slllclll<lll5 (11Uf">Und vic~<·s lhsl I truM "'l" rcsucrs will ><I mil >rc wiucly
bcld, or .u lcu1 cmcruinc.J, ;r tC"hth·ct~· r.ard~ c:rprcs:~~tJ, nn Amrrinn nmpusc,,
11
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informally to require apology (and, in some c:tses, what looks suspiciously like
University of Beijing-style "re-education"} 19 in response to speech expressing
views on issues of public :mc.l campus concern, did indeed present an easy case.
If questions that go to the core of human rights and social policy issues cannot
be freely debated on campuses, what issues can?
The regulation established a general, content-based regime of censorship of
polilically and socially controversial speech, with speech concerning issues of
race, gender, and sexual orientation subject to special restriction. Worse, within
that content-defined field of regulation, the censorship regime imposed a
vie.,..-point-spc:cific orthodoxy: students were allowed to state radical or liberal,
but not conservative or reactionary, views on controverted issues. They could
say th:u the mental abilities of blacks were equal to or greater than those of
whites, but not lesser; th:ll homosexuality was a culturally . formed category of
scxu:1l preference or a natural inclin:uion, but not a disease or a sin; - th:1t
women's genetic endowments made them equ:~ l or superior to men in socially
v::llued activities, but not inferior. 20
Viewed from the civil -liberties perspective, regulations such as these are highly
suspect because they arc aimed squarely at the content of speech rather than
at its incidcnt:1l injurious consequences. Under cu rrent First Amendment doctrine,
no restriction focused on the communicative impact of speech is permissible
unless it· is necessary to prevent serious and imminent harm; the harm in
question cannot be simply o!Tcnsc, however strong and justified, at what is s:~id.
Finally, any restriction within these narrow confines must be uviewpoint neutral."
The urH.Icrlying idea is that there must be no itleologic:~l censorship - no
orficial regime: ofscreening utterances for the political, moral, or soci;~l acceptability
of the: message they dclivcr. 11 uThe First Amendment recognizes no such thing
as a 'false' idea." 22 The idea behind this slogan need not be a par!llyzcd relativism.
It can be a histOrically-founded liberal suspicion that officials are peculiarly
un likely to accurately disti nguish falsity from truUt under a regime of censorship,
:~s c>:pressed in J ustice Jackson's" classic Bamctlr opinion:
1'

J'ur (UmpJc. • •1utl~n; who h>d t«ilcd

I

hnmnrho\)ic limerick in clnt piU•bllplntd lht dtOJlplnJ a£

8()

Or it can be a republican faith in the citizenry's ability to respond to bad speech
with bener speech, as in Justice Brandeis's equally classic Whitney opinion:
Fear or seriou:; injury alone cannot justify suppression of free
speech ... Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards ... If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. uH
The civil-libcnics :~n:~lytical fr:~mework tenus to confine regulation of c:~mpus
verbal harassment to prohibiting conduct verging on assault, including perhaps
tortious "intention:~! infl iction of emotional distress" and ccnain face-to-face
insults th:~t arc especially likely to provoke immediate violence · - so-c:~llcd
"fighting words." FurtJ1cr, the civil-liberties framework requires that any speech
regulations must be evenhanded; universities may not single out ideologically
defined classes of provocations or verbal assaults for prohibition. This, let it be
uid, is the moderate civil-libertarian position. Civil-liberties purists find even
the ~emotional distress" and "fighting words" theories insufficiently content
neutral and so oppose n11y disciplinary measures against verbal harassment
whatever- even in the extreme Wisconsin ex;~mplc I mentioned ahove. 25
For some, of course, the ·civil-rights and civil-liberties approaches arc not
"perspectives" on this problem; rather, one or the other of these :1pproachcs
simply states the rcaliry of Ute situation. Thus on the civil-rights side, many
students at Stanford were sincerely shocked when free speech concerns led
university authorities not to prosecute the llccutoven poster episode at Stanford
that I described above. A number of them described this as :in instance c){
12king something that was cl~arly one thing - · :i racist atrocity, which if left
unpunished established an officially condoned practice of discrimination - and
"ruming it into" a civil liberties issue. Later in the year, when members o( a
left-activist student coalition seized {forcibly, but without causing personal injury
or property damage) the ofTicc of Ute p!)Csidct'll of the university, they cited the

0

(ulhcr than d!Kil'linary 1'\Jk>) U I remedy for omrus dlscrimin~lion, (CncnJ!y wllhOUI much scnuus Ollt!1UoD
1u tl1c qur,tinn nf -.·h~l , uch ·cdm: ~lion• may e-nuit In my own vie w. the: won.t of both worldt l.s tcbieved •hen
muhiruhu rol «n•ioi,;l)' lf>ining (nlu•blc u it c1n be when .June well) I• Imposed u 1 penal unction fot
haru•mcnr , ( o<out.J 1h1tply '"ff>r>l< J'Ufti)hmcnl of hat>Urncnt (which thnuld be Confined IO CUU of lnltntioru.J
'"'''"~.J,.in~) frnm oricn111ion drnn• oimcd., •cquainrinr student.< and o1hcn .nth lhc divcnc cuhural bockJrOund"
..cr<curinnt. and t cnsiti••itiu !hey ate lihly to mcCI In lhc tontcmp<>nry uni•<nil)'.
10 Thc pbintifT in the ~lic higan o sc "''U 1 P')'<holo,- gndu>le ttudcnl worklnB on lhc biologicol bulo of
J ifTucncn in pcr«>n.alil)' traiu >nJ me nul abilitiu. I tc >llcgcd, quilt plautlbly, lhal rcru in lhcoricr in hls field
cnuld he rcrcci<td u •uht or u cis1 , •n •h•t lhcir discussion mighl be unc1ion.ablc under the rollcy. D.t o.
.\ht AitD•. p. MSH.
11 An uccllr nl >nd of~tn·ci lcd ,lo.;\rin>l m>ly•is, di•linp;uishins 1hc key ltmu or an' a "communicalivc lmroct."
·ronren•: •nd ·,;,,.f'Oinl," is GcrorTr<y Stan<, •cantenl Regula~ion and 1he F'lnt Amcndmcnl," ll'i/H- ..J
•\f • .., 1.•• Rn--rw. •nt 2S ( 1983), I'· lH9.
11 /lwuln M~111<i•r ,._ r.t,r/1. lOR S. Ct. l\71>, 879 (198R); comport Crru ~. Robnt Writ~. ~t8 U.S. 32l, ll9

u Wnt YittinU. Stlltr Bo•rJ •/ EJ.(atio• v. Bornrttr, J 19 U .S. 6H, 613 (t9H). Comr>re Tr:r4J v. ]•~••••. 109
S. Ct. 2SJJ, 2S+i: •tf lht~ Is 1 bed roc~ principle undrrl.rlns 1hc
Amcndmcnl, il is lh>l lhc govemmcnr
lbaJ' not prohibh the cxprcnion of >n id u bcnusc JOCi<l)' finds the idea itscl£ offensive or di<>gret>btc.•
"Wlit•ry v. Co.liforni... lH U. S. JS7, 377 (1927).

r;.,,

~The moderate view ;, ts~cldly well mkul>1cd, by • present General Counsel of the AC.I.•U, in N >dinc
Sttoucn, "Rc!'Jbrins C.mpur S~rrht A Modest Prof>oul: Dwlr u~. Jowrn•( p. ~8J. S1ruucn, like other
.OO.rsltt, Is more skrpdc•l o( lhc "lish!ing words" !han of lhc •cmotinn>l disll'css" nrion>lc. The puri" ,;cw
It ~fcmblc from F'ronltlyn llaiman. S,m •ntl [..,. ;,. • FIT( Sorirty (Chlor>: Uni•mhy of Chic.ago. I?Rl) .
IWman ohogclhcr rcjecu lhe "lnsult int or lighdnc words" dOCtrine, (pp. 131-JS, 2SI>-S9); he ""''ulcJ confine
llncdorn for 't'Crb.lf in Oictinn of tmnUnn-al dl.UttJ.S to CU.CI o( injury duou,h intcnrinn:~d (Jctu11 misrcprcscnutirH\

w. t~S-S 6).
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If there is any star fixed in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no offici:~!, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .. .2l

d)>t~< >J(lliMI him. under tht Michit>n ft!'Jiationt In lciUm £or • ehnraom •rolosr, • lcncr or apology IO lhc
umru • p>p<r. and ancndancc •• a "py np oution;• Do< "· U•iwnity .[ Mi<AiK""· p. 86S. It hu become 1
comrn•tnrh cc: .Jmnnl ci"'ii-Ubtnubn opr<mcnu of verb::. I h:arusmcn! feruladon to 1trcu d1r utU.1y o( •c:duutJon•
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believe that some such accommodating solution, as against a "principled" choice
implementing one ~ppro:tch to the exclusion or the other, is needed. 30
The first section of the provision restates Stanford's policy on free expression,
including an insistence that students must learn to .,tolerate even expression of
opinions which l11ey rmd abhorrent ." Counterposed is a second section restating
the university's existing policy against discrimination "in the administration or
its educational policies" on the basis of "sex, race, color, handicap, religion,
sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin," and adding tl1at harassment
on the basis of these characteristics can, when cumulated, constitute hostile
environment discrimination under the policy. The third section notes that the·
free expression and anti-discrimination policies conflict on the issue of ''erllal
harassment; it provides that "protected free expression ends and prohibited
discriminatory harassment begins,.. at the point wh1=rc expression of opinion
becomes "personal vilification" of a student on the basis of one of the characteristics
stated in the a~ti-discrimination policy.
The operative part of the provision comes in the fourth and last section,
which defines "personal vilification" as speech or other symbolic expression that
(a) is intended to insult or stigmatize individuals on the basis of one of the
designated characteristics; (b) is "addressed directly" to those insulted or
stigmatized; and (c) mak es use of "insulting or 'fighting' words," defined (quoting
from Chap/indy v. Nrw Hampshirc-11 ) as words (or non-verbal symbols) that ~by
their very utterance inOict injury or tend to incite to an immediate breach or
the peace."
Finally, the proposal adds a narrowing proviso designed to adapt the Cl:aplimJ:y
insulting-or-fighting words concept to civil-rights enforcement. In the context
of discriminatory harassment, punishable words (or symbols) arc defined as
those "commonly understood to convey direct and visceral hatred or contempt
for human beings on the basis of" Lhe characteristi•cs specified in the anti
discrimination policy - :1 phrase meant to capture the sense of the common
expression "racial epithets" and to extend it to other prohibited forms of
discrimination.
To summarize, the mlc wouhJ punish speech directed .to individuals: speed;
meant to insult them em the basis of a prutcr.:tctl cha.r:tcteristic that also makes
IJSC Of One of the gutter epithetS or bigotry. It thus adC•ptS one clement of what
\ have called the "moderate civil libertarian" view or harassment regulation; it
prohibits only expression that falls roughly 'within the categories of fighting
words or intentional inflir.:tion of emotional distress doctrines. The provision
therefore only prohibits a very narrow category of expression, immunizing even

I

Beethoven incident as one of their main grievances; when they were charged
(:md ultimately found guilry) under the universiry disciplinary code for the
takeover, they so~id it was an irony that their "peaceful protest" had been punished
while this clear incident of racist persecution had been treated as protected free
speech.
On the other side, many civil libertarians simply do not see the problem as
invoh·ing issues of civil rights or discrimination at all. It is not a clash of equal
protection and free speech, they insist, but a pure civil liberties issue, in which
fr:.gilc free speech values are threatened by powerful political pressure groups
on liberal campuses. For these civil libertarians, protecting discriminatory verbal
harassment is no diiTcrcnt from protecting flag-burning; it represents the principled
defense of reason against the perennial collective emotional impulse to censor,
16
rather than answer, the speech of unpopular and oflen unpleasant dissenters.
1\ly own view is that there arc plenty of good reasons, and plenty of worthy
p:~ssions, on both sides of the issue. And they seem to me really to be sides 
muwally incommensurable perspectives- rather th::tn the poles of a well-defined
ron tinuum along which negotiators may approach each other in se-arch of a
17
solution that measurably splits the difference betweefl them. The epigraph to
this essay occurs in the course··.of Wittgenstcin's famous discussion of the
ambiguous "duck-rabbit" drawing, which can appear as either a duck or a
r:.bhit, depending. on how you look at it. 28 You can learn facility at shifting
between seeing the figure as a duck and seeing it as a rabbit, but at any moment
it appears only in one aspect or the other. The campus harassment issue has
something of the same quality.

11
Let me now describe the proposal I originally drafted, which was recently
adopted as a disciplinary rule covering discrimin::ttory verbal harassment at
Stanford. 1Q The pro\'ision is an attempt to accommodate competing values, to
mctliatc the incommensurable conflict of civil-liberties and civil-rights approaches
on this i~!'ll<.:. 1 am not conf•Jent that it is better th:tn other mediating solutions,
though I on ~·he a rc::~son li1r the choice of e:tdl of its clements. llut I do
''II h>' hccn m)' l'",.on>l c~<ricncc in dcha.rin~ 1his i.suc wilh colleagues >nd stuJcniS lhal few causes anract
m•><C l"'"'crful (l<'lnli"nal aJhcrcn« 1han Jocs First Amendment ah!IOiutism. I make 1hc f'Olnl nol lo disparar
rl"' »p<CI of their commilment, hut bcc>u.c chillibcn•rians frequen1ty po5e ll1c •crbal harusmenl issue (lyl'tcally
•n•lnjry 111 1hc
i"uc) •s a dash between "reuon" on !heir side and "cmotinn" on <he olhcr.
( ln rhc urhcr <ide. 11111 a few
lake up 1he same binary-OVPOsition betwc<n "ruson" and
"p><<iun" •nd rum ir uound ro accu>e fret spccch
of <he mor>l defecl of ccrebrol and unfcclinc

~ith

O•~·humin~
chil·ri~hiS cr•li~arians

c1ici,m.
"tncnmmcmur>hk cnnfli<IS arc,

lO One example of m >hcrnarh·c m<tliating solu1iun was the siru•linn 21 Sr•nfi•ld hc(urc •Joption o( 1hc
lwusmrnl provisioo. The unh·ersil),., rrcsidcnt and ~cncul counsel had uid puhlidy th>t (>c<·ln·f•cc u1c uf
Mia\ cpilltcll cuuld be cunsiJrrcd 111 •·iuhte lhc lu n~ ·s tanJ lns "l'unJ>tncnlat Sr•ndnJ" which rcquirnl o(
wdcnu cnnduct on•nifeuin~ such "ICSpccr fur the ril(hu of nthcn. " is cll(l<etcd u(
cititcns.· Thnush that
oolunon
t~ lillie suid>nCe tn s> .i~fr civil llhcnics concerns in nty vicy,·, il .,.., in the umr h>llp>tO. " the
..,. later •dt~ptc.l. 01her cunorlrs nf mcdi•rin~t soluriuns include 1hc rt~larion >~lnptrd •• 11te University of
Calilnmi• an•l rhr one l'"'f"l<td 21 rhc llni•·crshy
Tens. Sec Rill< .12 hrlu•·.

dcfcndc~

r<tught~.

lhn.c we hHe 10 ruolvc in 1he ah"ncc of • salisfaCiory detcrmininc
"""" (<uh,unriH rule . apcc•t rrucedur<, or e<unmon mcrric). They ue nol con1udictions 2nd need not 1>4
rc<nhol
·"'
discu"ion of value-incommensuubitity in ll•e cunlext of indh·idu•t >clion can 1>4

"irnlinnall~." ~ouJ

lnunJ in .lu"rh R>1, Tlor
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(Oxford: Clarrndun l'rcss, t'lR6).

'' \\iu~cn<rcin. P~ilm"('hit•l hn·fllix•'i""'· r· 1'14.
z··t \u:: IC\t or lh(' Su.nfnnl rc:pa)Jiilln h ~\en in the Appendix.
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the vilest h:~tc-spccch a<.l<.lr~sscd generally to a campus audience as well as many
serious face-to-face discriminatory verbal assaults. Many students of color and
other Ci\"il-rights ad\'Ocatcs at Stanford have opposed it, for these reasons, as
ton weak an anti-discrimination measure.
At the same time, narrow as it is, the proposal retains enough of the civil
rights appro:~ch to trouble most civil libertarians. It seems to violate the second
cernt:il civi'l-liberlie.s .t enet: not only can speech be regulated only to the minimum
extent necessary to prevent immediate and otherwise unremcdiable harm; further,
any speech regulation must be nmtral- generally neutral as to content, certainly
neutral as to viewpoint. The provision's apparent violation of the neutrality
constraint results directly from its being framed as civil-rights protection or
anti-discrimination measure .
To hrin.g out the neutralitY problem, I need to describe more fully the legal
ur1,fc-~pinnings of the proposal. It docs not precisely track either of the most
common oases for narrow discriminatory harassment regulations: the "fighting
words~ or "intentional inniction. of emotional distress" rationales, which have
be en adopted at other universities in the wake of the Michigan case. 32 Rather,
it draws on the rcJe,·ant common clements in those two theories, adapting them
to the comext of a civil-rights-based campus harassment regulation.
In 1hc: Choplinsl')' case, a unanimous Supreme Court excluded from First
Amendment protection "insulting or 'fighting' words," those which "by their
\'cry utterance inflict injury" or that "tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Subsequent cases have focused on the "breach of the peace" half of
the category, and the Court has made clear that its reach is narrow indeed; it
has never affirmed a conviction under the doctrine since ChaplinsAry itself in
1942.n During those years, the Court has also developed the "heckler's veto"
doc1rinc :Is :1 counterweight to its "fighting words" proviso, putting the burden
on law enforcement to protect speakers against threatened violence, rather than
·
a,·oiding th e "iolence by silencing the s:peaker.H
The heckler's veto an:~lysis brings out the weakness in the "fighting words"
dot·trinc as it w:~s tra<.litiun:tlly formu b ted. The concept seems to ask purely
!3ctu:~l and prc<.lictivc questions. Can imminent violence be expected from an
auJicncc? Arc a"ailablc law cnfi>rcemcnt resources insufficient to protect the
sreaker? As many civil libertarians have argued, however, it seems inconsistent
with free speech values to punish a speaker simply because the heckler's veto
' 1 The L:n;\C,.ity uf Califnmia ha< adopted a rrohibition on student hornsmcnl by •figttting words." dcfin<el
>< -thn~c. r<nonatly ahush·c q>ilhcl> "'hich, when dirtetly addrnscd 10 any ordinary pcBDn arc, in the contal
u<rd and u • man<r of common trno.. tcdJe, inherently likely lo provoke • violent reaction "'hctlter or not !be-y
JClua1ty dn ~.· Thcu •inc\udc, hut 2rC' not \imitrd to• terms abu1i't't:: in tenns of ncC". Kl, or th~ other Cll~JOrid
of di<erimination Ia•·. llaunmcnt occurs •·hen filhtintt words ore uscd to "create • hostile and lntimldatlnJ
cmironmcnt" "'hich the uncrcr should know Y.itl in1erfere 'flith lhc victim's education .
.\ (O)ntminec 2llhc L"ni>trsirr of Tens has pro(IOScd. rccul>rion of•nclal hara..mcnl"lncklng !he RcSIOI<mml
nf Ton• .tclinitinn ••f inrcnliunal inOictiun uf emotional diurcss, wirh rhe •d.tldon of rhe eltmcnt of Intent to
"harn•. intimid>l<, nr humili>le ... nn account of race, color or nariunal origin." Esr•blishlnr • violulon nqulmt

.1n

JCIUJ( ~hmlin~t u( •nH·r('

"Sec G·~m

t'.

('ffiOiiun.a( t.Ji~.trcu•

on rhc part of the victim.

f."•l!fi•,.,i•. -\{)) IJ.S. 15 (1971); G,.Ji•tv. ll'it.nn, iQ5 U.S. 518 (1972).

"Cumpare C'rxo•ry ,., CAi••l". .194 U.S . Ill (1969) ""irh Ftinrr v. N"" Yor!, HO U.S, 315 (1951).
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m~de effective - bcc~usc, th;u is, ~ sufficient number of thugs have plausibly
threatened violence and available police protection is inadequate. A serious civil
libertarian presumption in favor of free speech seems 10 require some ev~luation
of what tl1e speaker has s~id - are they really "fighting words"? ·- before silencing
tlte spea ker in the face of a hostile audience can be said to be a proper response.
'I11e same requirement of normative evaluation of the speech must also apply,
it seems, in the case of intentional infliction of emotional dis1ress. And her~,
Indeed, the ev:tluative clement is explicitly built into the standard common law
elements of the tort. The viclim must foreseeably suffer severe emotional distress
from what the defendant does or says, but this is not sufficient. In addition,
the defendant's conducr must be, as Section 46 or the Torrs Restatement puts
it, in unmistakably evaluative terms, "beyond .all possible bounds of <Jcccncy~
:and "regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community~ 
in short, "ou1ragcous." 35
is

~,,

•'

:.l
'

'

~i

::,

, ·:

I suggest tl1at we interpret the Chaplinsk:J• category of "insulting or 'fighting'
words" as designating utterances that at least meet the standard set by Rcslatement
Section 46. For free speech purposes, though, the Section 46 standard is tno
purely evaluative - too vague. 36 But if the vagueness problem can be met (by
delineating a category of Utlerances that ar( "outra.g eous" and are given further
and more objective defin ition), then it woul<.l be reasonable - under Chaplinsky
- to treat those utterances as subject to prohibition because they arc likely cithrr
to provoke violence or to cause severe emotional distress.
The Stanford provision thus interprets CJ,ap/ins)ry's dual formulation to suggest
a category of speech, objectively "insulting" in character, that attacks the very
identity of its victim in such a way as to stimulate the familiar "fight or flight
rtaction." Among certain classes of hearers, partic~iarly young males socialized
to be physically aggressive, the typical reaction to a vile personal insult may be
•fight." For otlters - many men; perhaps most chil<.lrcn, most" older pcqple, _
most women; invalids - the typical reaction to , th,is kind of verbal assault is
some combination of extreme .fear, numbness, and impotent rage: reactions
calculated to produce the sort of "severe emotional distress" to which the
Restatement of Torts makes reference. We should read Chaplinsi.J•. in my view,
10 have identified two distinct kinds of reactions (fight or night) to the same
category of intolerable speech when it speaks, respectively, of utterances that
•tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" an<.l those that "by their very
uttcnnce inflict injury."
The Stanford provision identifies discriminatory "personal vilification" as a
class of unerances of which any instance: is particularly likely to produce one
D RnWnnml

of Tortr, 2d,

>cc.

~6.

commcnr (d).

'Outnrcousn=' in lhe orca of polirical •nd soci2l discounc hu •n lnhcrcnl subjccrivrncss •b.Jur il ..,hich
..wd .Oow • fury to imJ>01c liability on the huis of lhe furon' laSicJ or views, or p«h>r< on !he hasi< of rhdr
tWilc of • pmicutor <rpruslon.• /fw,l!rr
''· FtJJtzvfl, 108 S . Ct. 876, 8R2. The Coun's <lccisiun,
lo.ntr, docs nor foreclose ttnnlinK ton damages undcr lloe "outngcou<ncss" l<sl for infli<1ion of <motion,(
........ rhrough speech alone in • privarc or face·lo·facc context, ruhcr lh>n in ' published •nd n>tion>lly
6otributcd l•mpoon of an impon..nr public figure, •uch as W>s involve.! in Fa(tl'r//.
II•
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j, limitt:J fo r.ult~/ in!tuh~.
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h~ 11 .... •II Jj,~('min11ion u( idc:n b.a~.c..J ('" ucbl surt-rintif)' or hJircd . .. ... t..bri Mauud::t 2bly ltJUa the
~·JUU J ') \i~;'4', ur~n~ m•x.lificll_itm nJ Fitl.l Amc:odmcr\1 b,w In pcnnh the clC1cn$ion n( a limited version of the
int<m>ti,.n>l ":anclucl cu 1hi~ c..unll)' in -rublic Response 10 R•cist Speech: Consid<rins the Viclim'o St"'};
.II.. A•t•• ,.., •. Rn ·inr. \nl. 117 (1 111!'1). p. 2J20. ,\s Pcofcssnr 1\bt$\nh"s mid< clocumcncs. msny Western cuunlrln
h•>< ,u,•h ''"~ · Thr C>nJJi•n h>ll' ·>recch >Uiucc h currrnll)" undu rc'·icw b)· the Supreme \.nun of C.nado
[, , il< ("'"i<l<nC)' " i<h 1hc fr<e C\rr•:,sion tnJ>r•nlcc of che rcccncly adopu·d Gnuli•n Chutcr of Riahu ....
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or the other o•...c kinds onnjury covered by the "fighting words" and "emotional
distress" analysis. These are, in Richard Delgado's phrase, "words that wound"
- utterances directed to members of groups specially subject to discrimination,
intended to insult or stigmatize- them, and making use of the small class of
commonly recognized w•onls or symbols that have no other function but to
convey hatred and "contempt for these groups.J7
Professor Delgado ofrcrs as the test for liability under his proposal the
requirement that the words directed to the victim be such as "a reasonable
person would recognize :ts a racial insult." In a campus context, where claims
of insult and ideological debate are often intertwined, this phrasing raises special,
and I think avoidable, civil-liberties problems. Some ideas might be taken as
r:~.cial or ethnic insults by virtue of their content alone: for example, claims that
th~: llolocaust never happened, or that blacks arc genetically inferior to whites.
To 3\"c>id b:~nning ideas as such on the basis of propositional content, on campus
or elsewhere, the St:mfcml regulation prohibits only verbal abuse including actual
·· rlcial epithets, or their equivalents for other fonns of discrimination. 38 These
art: the all- too-familiar words that carry with them so inseparable a message of
h;~trcd ;~nd contempt that apologies. arc in order for the affront involved in even
quoting them: "nigger," "kikc," "faggot," "cunt," and the like. 39
Racial and other discriminatory hatred and contempt can be effectively
c>:presscd without using these words, of course, but (partly in the interests of
avoiding vagueness and its chilling effect) such casc:s are not included under
the regulation. A white student can tell a black student,: face-to-face, "you
pt:ople are inferior and should not be here," but not be guilty of harassment.
In addition, even gutter eipthets are immunized when uttered to the campus
or puhlic at large, in order to give the widest possible leeway for speech in .the
puhlic foium; the Klan or the nco-Nazis may demonstrate and display their

u.,..-.,J r:n·il Ri~hii·Cn i//.i~r>1on

.. .. ..........

symbols and shout Lltcir words of hatred with impunity. This very much narrows
the reach of the proposal and exposes ir to the charge, mentioned before, that
it is mere tokenism. Bur ar the saine rime, it helps meet traditional and lcgitimalc
civil-liberties con_cerns about public political expression, and abour vagueness
and its accompanying chilling effect. •o
The Stanford prO\'ision has also been drafted with an eye on another concern
- one root.cd in the civil-rights perspective, and oflen noted as well in chil
libertarian objections to "hate speech" or "group defamation" regulations!' The
concern is illustrated by one of Lhc cases that occurred under the Michigan
regulation. A black woman law student, in the course of a heated argument,
called a classmate "white trash." She was charged with a violation of the
harassmcm rule; she uhimatcly agreed to write a formal lcHer of apolot,'Y to
the classma1e in settlement of the charge ..
Under the Stanford provision, calling a while student "white lrash" would
nor constitute harassment. In its commonly undcrslood meaning, the term is
Oike "redneck") derogatory to the poor whites of-the rural South by vinue of
their class, not their racc.H If 1he student addressc.:d came from that social
background, and if dass bias were a form of discrimin:Jtion covered · by the
proposal (as it is ll<ll), there might be a disciplinary case. BUI as a white person,
she is not a victim of discriminatory racial harassment; the term "white trash''
is clearly not "commonly understood" to convey hatred or contempt for whites
on the basis of their race as such - a requirement for liability under the
provision. This is not 1<1 deny that the black wom:m student intended to express
flee-based hatred or co ntempt, .or that she may have effectively <::onvcycd a
flcial insult, just as a white st.udent docs who tells a black student that "you
people arc inferior and shouldn't he here." In neither case, though, is
th~ regulation violated, because in neither case is Lhcre usc of one of the re
quired "commonly undcrsto()(J" assaultive epithets or symbols of <liscriminatory
•rontcmpt
,~

The point of the "white trash" case can he generalilcd, and i~ a way th:tt
is most troubling tel ci\"il libertarian defenders of viewpoint neutrality. As bes1
I can sec, there :1re no epithets in ·this society at this time that nrc "cornmonly
understood" to convey hntrcd anti contempt for whites ns wch. The same c:1n
be said, I believe, of males as such, and heterosexuals :.1s such. •·1 If Lhis is
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intlced a socio-linguistic 1fact, it is of course one not fixed in stone; on the
other hand, it is no accident. The denigrating epithets covered by the Stanford
provision are able 10 inflict the serious and distinctive injuries characteristic of
lcplly prohibited invidious discrimination because they strike at groups subjected
to longstant!in~ and deep-rooted prejudices widely held and disseminated
throu~hout our culture. American children grow up with the negative stereotypes
of blacks, women, and homosexuals in their bones and 'in their souls. This is
tragically true, too, of children who are black, female, or later identify themselves
as homosexual.
The denigrating epithets draw their capacity to impose the characteristic civil
rights injury to "hearts and minds" from the fact· that they turn the whole
socially and historically inculcated weight of these prejudices upon their victim.
Each hatemonger. ~ho invokes one of these terms summons a vicious choms
in his support. It is because, giv~n our cultural history, no such gt:rrtral prejudices
strike against the dominant groups that there exist no comparable terms of
universally understood hatred and contempt ;~pplicable to whites, males, and
heterosexuals as such.H

Given its narrow coverage, the Sranford provision obviously does not embody
a particularly radical or utopian civil-righ1s approach. Its categories and its thrust
largely reflect a civil-libenies perspective on the racial harassment problem. The
exclusive remedy it contemplates for all but a tiny fraction of discrimina!·ory
speech is !he one civil libertarians favor: more speech. But the features it adop!s
from a civil-rights approach still jar most civil lib~rtarians; indeed, they jar me
when 1 look at the problem through a civil-liberties lens. First, the provision
lacks content-neutrality; it regulates only speech bearing on marters of race,
gender, sexual orientation, and the like while neglecting other speech that might
5imilarly provoke violence or cause similarly severe emotional distress. Second,
and even more troubling, the rule bears asymmetrically on its restricted subject
m.:lller in a way that, to some, will seem inconsistent with viewpoint-neutrality.
That is, it may seem biased against the disfavored ideologies of racism, sexism,
and homophobia, openly favoring "politically correct" egalitarians against their
adversaries in !he campus marketplace of opinion. It arguably takes from the
bigots emotively powerful rhetorical weapons - the traditional hate epithets 
without imposing comparable restrictions on the other side. It is as if renns
like "commie" and "pink0" were barred from political debate, while "imperialist
lackey" :md "capitalist running dog" were allowed . This seems to viobte official
neutrality: the principle or "no orthodoxy in matters of opinion," "no such thing
a.s a false idea."
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h.. ' "l d.. uht ......, the current .undud lnsuhinr C'f'llhets for their roupt.
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h>oo inw~cd '' the cquintrnt. •rrllcd In lhrm. of the sundnd rocbl cpilhctJ u •rrlicd to the studcntl ol
'"'"' t.n•in1 '" unc siJc "htthcr uniu•tifitd use n( a ttnn like this lnnicLS the umc level of Injury, h doa
n~ot in a·ny e•·cnt cnmc -..ithin the cl>>< of injuriu ll••t conC<m civil rishLS law and policy. The tcnn "whitt
nci•t- Jnc; not dcnip~cc "hitcs ~• t•tA, ony more thsn "bbc1t. scporatist racist" dcnirrat« blocks u 1\Kh. Iii
aJ.Iitiun, mnn~ ci•·il-lihcnic• ~onsidct>tinns Jistini'Ji~h the uus. Tc11111 of ~litif41abusc like "white nclo1• (ot
· su.tini,t." "Kui." -~<rruri,t') >« ><>mctimcs acruutcl)· and •rrmrri •tdy aprlicd to lndMduals In robust dcbo!Y;
cu t•tly .. hen chry l'"lf'<'l!' •rrl)". h.. ,......,, iJ rnlitlull~ cnntrnvenhl. In contrut, the Stan(ord prmlslon rnta
"" tloc rr.mi'c that the ncial (>II~ otlon) discrimin11ory I'Jil<r epithets It dealt with ore "twr awmprialel,
~ ;,, .,,,, u l n~ i' i~u>l<; en(urccmcnt co( chc pro'i~inn, therefore, .Jncs not invoh·e lhe palltic•lly ch~r&cJ t"l ol
Ji,nin1in.uinF hcNttn iu,1ihcJ :~nJ uniu\otificd uses.
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question of affinnalive action -the ques;tion of whether symmetric or asymmetric
policies are best suited to attain the goal.)

Ill
The Stanford provision, then, while neutral on its face, will foreseeably be
asymmetric in its application. This aspect of the provision allows its interpretation
to reflect a state of aITa irs central to civil-rights analysis- the continued existence
of asymmetric social relations of group domination and subjugation in the United
States. Contrary to the democratic ideal, American .society {like other societies)
is still characterized by a hierarchy of relatively srable ascriptive status groups.
To rephr:tse the poinr from the jargon of sociology 10 the rhetoric of movement
politics, there still exist "oppressor" and "oppressec.l" (or, 10 lower t..he politie2l
pitt:h, "privileged" and "subonlinaled") groups, identified as such by characteristics
such as race, gender, class,.and sexual preference. Indeed, the civil-rights project
can hest be understood as at once premised on the existence of these groups'
asymmetric power relations and aimed at the ultimate elimination of the
asymmetries. (To describe it rhus is not to decide in advance the dcbauble
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This civil-libertarian objection helps bring out. the c.leep strueture of the
conflict between the two approaches. From the civil rights perspeetive, there
arc false ideas and ideologies, among which white supremacy and related forms
of bigotry are the paradigm examples. The insult and stigma ·i~~olved i!l .rhe ..
Imposition of supremacist ideologies on those whom they oppress and exclude
from full citizenship attacks what John Rawls has called the most func.lamental
of those "primary goods" that government is established to allow individuals to
pursue - those that form the basis of self-respecr.~s The protection of the basis
of the individual's capacity for self-respect againsr violation by socially authoritative
humiliation is as much at the heart of equal protection as is official viewpoint
neutrality in regulating tJ1e marketplace of idea.s th~t is at the heart of free
expression.
The analysis of the civil-rights approach in terms of preventing exclusion by
the social imposition of c~ste-_bascd stigma supplies the standard 'rationale for
the central doctrine of modem .ami-discrimination law: the rejec~on of the
•scpu:ate but equal" version of Jim Crow. 46 The doctrinal problem was this:
A st2te supplies equal (but separate) facilities to whites and blacks - schools,
public parks, beaches, buses, amenities in public buildings, etc. 1-Iow docs this
"John 1Uwl1, A 11tt<>ry •f]ullir< (\.amb ridsc: llorvard, 1971), pp. 178-79, H0-16, HJ-·17.
"II,._ o.
t{ £Jut»tt"tm, Ji7 U.S. i8) (19Si); «c olso Al•yor of B•lrimnrr t•. D•"',."· JSO U.S. R77
(1955) (bcochu); c.,r- "· Bro..Jn, JS2 u_o;_ 90J (1956) (bum); 1/o/,us v. CiiJ •[ Arlut4. JSO U.S. 879 (1955)
(aolf COUtKs); J•Aruon t•. Vi'K''"i•. 373 U.S. 61 (196]) (courthousu) .
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Cl(u:dity-prc:serving separat~n of the races violate the Constitution's prohibition
of racially un(qualtreatment? The Bronm line of C2ses answers that the inequality
inheres in the subordinating character of the mwage delivered by the separation
- the material state action, separate b1:1t equal segregation, viewed in isolation
from its communicative impact, fully preserves equality. Plmy had said that if
hbck people felt insulted by the separation, that was only their interpretation;
Brown finally (and re:~lisric:tlly) accepted that the insulting interpretation was the
only plausible one.""'
Dut the Pks~y formula is a quite appropriate response to a complaint of
Jiscriminatory segregation in some social contents. Separation sometimes stig
matizes no one. -The maintenance of separate men's and women's restrooms in
public buildings, for example, does not by itself constin1te invidious sex
discrimination. But in the context of this society and its history, the Jim Crow
nric1y of racial segregation imposed inequality because it rested on the assumption,
;~ nd hence delivered the message, that whites were a superior caste to be
prnu:ctcd fmm the polluting contact of their black inferiors. The insulting
messlge, the wound inflicted by the authoritative endorsement of the "false
idea" of white supremacy and black""unworthincss, was what made Jim Crow

or heterosexual) supremacy must be kept distinct from uts prcac_hing; while the
former violates the anti-discrimination principle, the latter is protected by the
principle of free expression. Q_uestions of the boundary between speech and
·
action may present difliculty, but the structure is clear.
The point is quite general: the Constitution certainly requires the praaiu of
republican govcr~ment, due process, and non-establishment of religion, as well
as non-discrimination. Dut equally central is the principle of free expression,
which includes the freedom to preach dictatorship, summary justice, theocr-acy
- or even universal censorship. And so, the argument continues, the same
principle guaranrees freedom to advocate racist and other inegalitarian doctrines
- 2s, indeed, many First Amendment decisions firmly establish.S1
Second, the argument continues, the invocation of Brown to support the
suppression of racist speech ignores the public-private distinction, which is
essential to the maintenance not only of free speech hut also of such other civil
liberties as freedom of religion. If Brown docs perhaps strike at certain "speech"
(more precisely, at the communicative clement in certain actions), it is only at
official speech, which has never been tl10ught protected by a principle of free
expression. What the First Amendment protects is the right of private individuals
to deliver those same messages.

unconstitutionai.~K

Essentially the same wound is the injury inflicted on minority, female, and
gay students or employees when endemic verbal abuse renders educational or
work environment discriminatorily "ho~ilile" within tl1e tenns of discrimination
l:!w. In this sense, the focus on symbc•lic injury to tl1e "hearts and minds" of
hl:lck children in the desegregation cases supplies the basic authority for campus
,·c rhal harassment regulation; Bromn, as Charles Lawrence strikingly argues,
Mm ay be: read as regulating the content of racist spccch."~ 9
- The civfl-libenarian, dediclted to a principle of liberal official neutrality in
the markcrplace of ideas, sees this as a perverse misstatement of 'Brown. It
,ignores rwo crucial distinctions, the argument runs: speech vs. action, and public
vs. private. 5 First, the civil-libertarian insists that the practiet: of white (or male,

While the equal protection clause might, for example, prohibit a legislature
from placing a white supremacist slogan on a stale's seal, flag, public buildings,
and the like, the First Amendment just as firmly protects the freedom of private
individuals to put t.hat slogan into free competition against more egalitarian ones
in the marketplace of ideas. Not only the Oag, but also a copy of the Brown
decision, or a picture of Martin Luther King, can be defaced in public with
impunity under the first Amendment - though of course, a.o; the civil-libertarian
usually adds, government officials should denounce such .racist outrages, just
as university authorities should denounce racist speech on campus while resolutely
protecting it against coercive inrerfercnce.

°
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,.. f"r~u•••. I I>J t:.S. SJ7, SS I (I S?6), rejectinB lh~ cl>im that "the enforced separation of the two

r>.-c~ ' ""'P' che cn1orc.J ucc '""ilh a bo.Jgc n_( infcrinril)'" on <he ,.-ound c}ut "(ilf this be to, It Is not by teuon
ohi n~ found in <he ttl, hu1 snlely bcuu>e 1he cnlnre.J race chooses to put that construction upon h."

,( ' "!

C:wn p>rc B"'""' c·. fi,.,,J •{ I:'Jutori""· H7 U.S. ~83, ~94 (19H).
" t-:umuml Cahn c~rly on ofTcrcJ 1hi' utiun.Jfc :u; 'he: ptopc-r inlcrprctalion of Brvwr~:
.'\, is nh•ct\'t <l in Lloe •nd eno Uahylonian T>lmud. tO ~h>me >nd degude a fdlow-crururc b 10
wmmit • kinJ oof I''Y<'hie tn >yhcm upnn him . u•e •n :uuibnt's knife, humili>tion slashes his .. !{.
rcs(l<"ct •ml hum•n tlignity. I I< grows p>lc. the blood nuhes from hi• face juS! as thought it lud
hcen 'hcd . Tlut ;, why ,..• >rc JCCU>tomed lu soy hr ftrh · ..,ounded." . ..
So one <pe>ks in terms of the most familiar >nd uni•ersally accepted standards of right and wronf
~~ohcn one rcmarls (I) that racial segreg-ation under government auspices inevitably inOicu humiliation,
>nJ (l) that ul!icial humili>tion of innocent, l>.,..·abiJing citizens is psychologically injuriow and
morally ,(\il .. .
")uri,pru.lcncr: Sruo )"or~ t"nn·mi(T 1.... Rn·irrl'. vol. JO (1955). pp. Hl\--59.
•• Chulcs . l.a..nncc Ill, "If lie It oilers Let !lim Go: Rerularing Raci<t Speech on Campus," Dul-t '-
7"""'"'· --,-~1_ IY'l{l. rr- 9{11, 909.. ~ly tre>tmcnt of B.-ow• has been much innuenced by this excellent article.
'
"<~ :"."ldinc Sno\.\cn conlcsts the Brorron .:analogy in 1hut ttrms in htr 2niclc: cilcd above:.
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When we tum to look at the world through the civil-rights lens, though, we
the public-private distinction. 52 The dvil-rights approach
seeks to cleanse not only the state but civil society generally of racist and other
bigoted practices. The formal constitutional expression of the public-private
distinction, the state action doctrine, tends to break down in the area of
discrimination law. Nothing approaching a clear line separates (prohibited) official
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~nd much less clarity in
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C>I/in v. Sm•tlt. S7R 1'.2J 11?7 (7th Clr. 197A). {(tt. J"' irJ iJ6 U.S. ?SJ (1978} : Bra•tknburt v. m;•. J95
(1969); l'rrmi"itllo L'. Cloito,..,, JJ7 U.S. I (19f9). The Coun h>l reitruu:d the point in Jignilicanr
Acta In lhe n•g· buming C:OJCJ. "lloe Flm Am.ndmenr cJocs not (UU>ntce th>l other conetpl< \'inv>llr ucrcd
lo our N>tion >J a " 'hole - Juch u lh< principle th•c di$criminotion on rhe h»is of roce ,is O<lious •nd dcstnrcc ve
- wll1 JO unchollenged In <he no>rkciJ!hce of ideu." Ta.., v. J•A~ron, 109 S. Cr. 25JJ, ZSH (1989). "We •re•
........, tht duecnrion of the n.g b deeply orTcn<ioc ;o many. Out rhe nme might be: sold. for .cnmplc, t>(
tln!lcnc ctl~nic and reli3iouo epitheu !cicins Ttm(i~irllol • . . .• U•irrJ St•in u. Eitlt,..,•• 110 S . Ct. HOi. 2-110
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"The reliance o( lr.adiriunal civil·lihcrtics 13\1." on a pubHc .. privalt distinction much srrnngcr 1han we recognize
rlonmcrc Is the theme of Funk Michdm•n. "Conception• of Democracy in !omeric>n Consticution•l Argument:
1\c Cue of l'omogr>phy Rcrul•tion." Tm.nm L.,. Rn·i,;,, vol. 56 (1989), p. 291.

